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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Virginia examined a variety of domestic rela-
tions problems and issues during the last decade. Most of the court's de-
cisions involved divorce issues such as jurisdiction, alimony or support
and maintenance, and child custody or support orders. However, the
court also decided cases on annulment, the enforcement of support and
maintenance decrees, legitimacy and paternity, adoption, name changes
and intrafamily tort immunity.1
1. The decisions by the Virginia Supreme Court regarding intrafamily tort immunity will
not be discussed in the text of this note. It should be noted, however, that the court has not
abolished the doctrine. See Wright v. Wright, 213 Va. 177, 191 S.E.2d 223 (1972) (parental
immunity upheld in action by unemancipated child against father for alleged acts of simple
negligence not related to his business or vocation and not involving a motor vehicle). See
also Counts v. Counts, - Va. , 266 S.E.2d 895 (1980) (wife immune from liability in tort
for personal injuries intentionally inflicted upon her husband at her direction during their
marriage). The 1981 Virginia General Assembly significantly negated the holding in Counts,
however, by abolishing the common-law defense of interspousal immunity in causes of ac-
tion in tort arising on or after July 1, 1981. 19- Va. Acts, ch. - (to be codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-220.1).
Rather than abrogate the doctrine of intrafamily tort immunity, the court has chosen to
create several narrow exceptions. See Korman v. Carpenter, 216 Va. 86, 216 S.E.2d 195
(1975) (action for wrongful death may be maintained and predicated upon injuries to one
spouse arising out of wrongful act by the other spouse, when such act terminates marriage
by death, and when the deceased spouse is survived by no living child or grandchild); Sur-
ratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971) (interspousal immunity abolished in
actions for personal injuries resulting from motor vehicle accidents); Smith v. Kauffman,
212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971) (parental immunity abrogated in automobile accident
litigation).
The court has likewise declined to construe liberally these exceptions to immunity. See
McMillan v. McMillan, 219 Va. 1127, 253 S.E.2d 662 (1979) (Surratt exception to inter-
spousal immunity not applied in action by wife when automobile accident occurred in Ten-
nessee and that state had not abrogated doctrine); Tyles v. Jackson, 216 Va. 797, 223 S.E.2d
873 (1976) (Smith exception to parental immunity did not have retrospective effect); Foun-
tain v. Fountain, 214 Va. 347, 200 S.E.2d 513 (1973) (Surratt exception did not have retro-
spective effect). The court's policy of preserving family and marital harmony through the
application of intrafamily tort immunity is contrary to the modern trend of abrogating the
doctrine. A majority of states have completely or partially abandoned intraspousal and pa-
rental immunity. See Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 901 (1979); Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 904 (1972). See
also Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REv. 823 (1956); Comment,
Intrafamily Immunity-The Doctrine and Its Present Status, 20 BAYLOR L. REv. 27 (1967).
See generally W. PRossmR, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTs § 122 (4th ed. 1971).
It should also be noted, however, that the Virginia Supreme Court has permitted one
spouse to testify against the other spouse in certain criminal proceedings. See Cumbee v.
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1132, 254 S.E.2d 112 (1979) (wife permitted to testify against her
husband during prosecution of husband for incest against their minor daughter); Stewart v.
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 887, 252 S.E.2d 329 (1979) (husband convicted ot grand larceny of
wife's personal property and wife permitted to testify against her husband because couple
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The purpose of this note is to provide a reference guide for the Virginia
practitioner regarding the supreme court's decisions during the past dec-
ade. Although the scope of this note necessitates limited analysis, rele-
vant cases, statutes and supplementary materials have been cited for fur-
ther reference purposes. For organizational purposes, the court's decisions
have been discussed under the major headings of ANNULMENT AND
DIVORCE and THE FAMILY.
II. ANNULMENT AND DIVORCE
A. Annulment
There were only two decisions by the Virginia Supreme Court between
1970 and 1980 which concerned annulment.2 In Sanderson v. Sanderson,3
the husband sought an annulment of his marriage on the ground of mis-
representation. Mr. Sanderson alleged that his wife falsely represented
before their marriage that she had been previously married and divorced
only once, when in fact she had been married and divorced five times.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of the annulment and
held that a misrepresentation as to prior marital status was not grounds
for annulment.4 This decision is in line with the weight of authority.5
In McConkey v. McConkey,6 the Virginia Supreme Court determined
that a divorced wife is not entitled to reinstatement of alimony payments
from her first husband upon annulment of her voidable second marriage.7
The court examined Code section 20-1108 and distinguished between
voidable marriages9 and those void ab initio.10 This distinction is impor-
not validly married at time of trial); Osborne v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 691, 204 S.E.2d 829
(1974) (actions of husband, charged with statutory rape of his stepdaughter, in beating wife,
did not constitute "privileged communications" within meaning of statute).
2. For the various statutory grounds for annulment, see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-89.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1980).
3. 212 Va. 537, 186 S.E.2d 84 (1972).
4. Id. at 537, 186 S.E.2d at 85.
5. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 85 Mass. (3 Allen) 605 (1862), is the leading early authority for
the view that fraud must relate to the "essentials" of marriage (e.g., ability to consummate
the marriage and to have children) in order to constitute grounds for annulment. For a
contemporary decision relying on Reynolds, see Masters v. Masters, 13 Wis. 2d 332, 108
N.W.2d 674 (1961). See generally cases collected in Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 759 (1967).
6. 216 Va. 106, 215 S.E.2d 640 (1975).
7. The annulment was based on fraud by the wife's second husband. As a result, the
marriage was voidable if the wife desired to have it annulled. Id. at 107, 215 S.E.2d at 641.
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-110 (RepL Vol. 1975) provides: "If any former spouse to whom
support and maintenance has been awarded shall thereafter marry, such support and main-
tenance shall cease as of the date of such marriage."
9. Voidable marriages enjoy legal validity until annulled because the aggrieved spouse
1981]
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tant because the court expressly refrained from deciding whether Code
section 20-110 "would apply to a person to whom alimony has been
awarded who thereafter is involved in a void marriage.""
The supreme court's decision in McConkey follows the general trend of
disallowing resumption of alimony payments from a former husband after
annulment of a voidable second marriage. 12 Although this area remains
unsettled,"' strong public policy arguments support the trend. It would be
unjust to compel a former husband to adjust his financial decisions to the
risk that his ex-wife's remarriage would not be valid. "The husband has a
right to assume the validity of the second marriage and to arrange his
affairs accordingly. When his former wife voluntarily accepts the risk of a
subsequent marriage, he should not be held accountable for her gullibil-
ity, mistake or misfortune.""
It is not unreasonable for an ex-spouse, either husband or wife,' 5 to rely
on Code section 20-110 and the validity of the ex-spouse's remarriage.
The decisions to remarry and to seek annulment are both within the ex-
clusive discretion of the other party. And, as the supreme court noted in
McConkey, a "voidable marriage may not be annuled for years.'"' The
court should likewise extend its holding in McConkey to remarriages that
are void ab initio since Code section 20-107 authorizes maintenance and
support in annulment proceedings.1
may ratify a voidable marriage. See Alexander v. Kuykendall, 192 Va. 8, 63 S.E.2d 746
(1951); Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp., 173 Va. 425, 4 S.E.2d 364 (1939).
10. A void marriage confers no legal rights and is incapable of ratification regardless of
the parties' desires. When it is determined that a marriage is void, it is as if no marriage had
ever been performed. 12B M.J., Marriage, § 6 (RepL Vol. 1978) (citing Chitwood v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of America, 206 Va. 314, 143 S.E.2d 915 (1965) (bigamous marriage void ab
initio)). Regarding void marriages in general, see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.1 (RepL Vol. 1975).
Regarding bigamous marriages void without decree, see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-43 (RepL VoL
1975).
11. 216 Va. at 107, 215 S.E.2d at 640 (emphasis added).
12. For a compilation of cases from various jurisdictions, see Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1033
(1972). See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATONS § 3.6, at 139-43 (1968).
13. Compare Robbins v. Robbins, 343 Mass. 247, 178 N.E.2d 281 (1961) and Cecil v.
Cecil, 11 Utah 2d 155, 346 P.2d 279 (1960) with Sefton v. Sefton, 45 Cal. 2d 872, 291 P.2d
439 (1955), Flanman v. Flayman, 57 N.J. 458, 273 A.2d 567 (1971), and Bridges v. Bridges,
217 So. 2d 281 (Miss. 1968).
14. 216 Va. at 108, 215 S.E.2d at 641.
15. In 1975, the Virginia General Assembly substituted "former spouse" for "person" and"support and maintenance" for "alimony" in VA. CODE ANN. § 20-110 (Repl. VoL 1975) as
well as other sections of Title 20 (domestic relations). 1975 Va. Acts, ch. 644.
16. 216 Va. at 108, 215 S.E.2d at 641.
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See Henderson v. Henderson, 187 Va.
121, 46 S.E.2d 10 (1948) (trial court had authority to make such further decree as it might
[Vol. 15:321
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B. Divorce
1. Grounds for Divorce
During the past ten years, the supreme court has continued its strict
construction of the traditional fault grounds contained in the Virginia di-
vorce statutes. 8 In Graham v. Graham,29 and Johnson v. Johnson'2 0 the
court held that a divorce cannot be granted merely because of incompati-
bility between spouses. "1 Although a husband and wife may have a
"deplorable marital situation" and "the ends of society would be perhaps
better served"2 2 if the parties were divorced, a trial court is not warranted
in granting a divorce upon insufficient evidence or upon uncorroborated
evidence where corroboration is required.2 3
The supreme court has declined to re-evaluate its precedents on cruelty
or to lessen the burden of corroboration in proving such charges.24 Absent
clear evidence of permanent and unexcused refusal of sexual relations by
either party, a showing of mere cessation of intercourse is not sufficient to
prove cruelty or constructive desertion.2 5 Thus, in Aichner v. Aichner,2 6
deem expedient in cases concerning the severance of the relations of the parties incident to
marriage).
Virginia is one of a minority of 10 states which have statutes expressly authorizing perma-
nent alimony upon annulment where such an award would be equitable. See H. CLARK,
Cases and Problems on Domestic Relations 214 (3d ed. 1980). Absent specific statutory
authority, it is generally held that permanent alimony may not be granted in annulment
suits since any claim for alimony is eliminated by holding that the marriage was void ab
initio. See Wigder v. Wigder, 14 N.J. Misc. 880, 188 A. 235 (1935). See generally Annot., 54
A.L.R.2d 1410 (1957).
18. For the grounds of divorce from bond of matrimony, see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Repl.
Vol. 1975). See also VA. CODE As. § 20-95 (Repl. VoL 1975).
19. 210 Va. 608, 172 S.E.2d 724 (1970).
20. 213 Va. 204, 191 S.E.2d 206 (1972).
21. The court in Johnson v. Johnson, 213 Va. at 211, 191 S.E.2d at 211 (quoting Graham
v. Graham, 210 Va. at 617, 172 S.E.2d at 730 (1970)) observed that the present situation was
an appropriate case for a non-fault divorce:
This case gives support to the action of the General Assembly of Virginia in providing
in Code § 20-91 that a divorce may be decreed on the application of either party if
and when the husband and wife have lived separate and apart without any cohabita-
tion and without interruption for two [currently one] years.
For discussion of decisions regarding "no-fault" divorce, see notes 42-62 infra and accompa-
nying text.
22. 210 Va. at 617, 172 S.E.2d at 730 (quoting DeMott v. DeMott, 198 Va. 22, 28, 92
S.E.2d 342, 346 (1956)).
23. 213 Va. at 210-11, 191 S.E.2d at 211.
24. For discussion of the lack of corroboration as a defense to divorce, see notes 63-74
infra and accompanying text.
25. 213 Va. at 209, 191 S.E.2d at 209 (1972) (citing Carneal v. Carneal, 211 Va. 162, 176
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the court held that a denial of sexual intercourse, when not permanent or
inexcusable, failed to constitute cruelty or constructive desertion when
other marital duties were satisfactorily performed.27 And, in Capps v.
Capps,28 the court found that one instance of physical cruelty was insuffi-
cient to establish a ground for divorce.2 9
Likewise, the court's decisions between 1970 and 1980 broke little new
ground in the areas of adultery and desertion. In Painter v. Painter,0 the
wife's petition for divorce on the ground of adultery was denied despite
strong evidence which suggested that her husband was involved in an
intimate relationship. 1 The supreme court upheld the trial court's denial
because the evidence to establish a charge of adultery must be clear, posi-
tive and convincing. "Strongly suspicious circumstances are
inadequate."'82
The court held, in Rowland v. Rowland,3 3 that demands to "get out"
were inadequate to support an award of divorce on the grounds of con-
structive desertion." In Graham v. Graham,35 it was not improper to
deny a husband's complaint of willful desertion where his wife's desertion
was justified.36
Finally, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the generally recognized
S.E.2d 305 (1970)).
26. 215 Va. 624, 212 S.E.2d 278 (1975) (husband's complaint of cruelty based solely on
wife's refusal to have sexual intercourse).
27. The parties separated and were reconciled prior to their final separation. Evidence
indicated that they engaged in sexual relations on one occasion after they were reconciled.
Id. at 625, 212 S.E.2d at 279.
28. 216 Va. 382, 219 S.E.2d 898 (1975).
29. The wife testified that her husband struck and choked her during an argument. There
was no substantial evidence that the husband's act of physical cruelty was so severe and
atrocious as to endanger the wife's life. Id. at 384-85, 219 S.E.2d at 899-901.
30. 215 Va. 418, 211 S.E.2d 37 (1975).
31. Mrs. Painter offered evidence of stains and lipstick on her husband's clothing, an inti-
mate note addressed to her husband, and a private investigator's testimony of clandestine
meetings between her husband and his alleged paramour. Id. at 419, 211 S.E.2d at 38. As a
general rule, the testimony of private investigators is of little probative value. See Gray v.
Gray, 181 Va. 262, 24 S.E.2d 444 (1943); Martin v. Martin, 166 Va. 109, 184 S.E.2d 220
(1936).
32. 215 Va. at 420, 211 S.E.2d at 38.
33. 215 Va. 344, 210 S.E.2d 149 (1974).
34. The husband's demand to his wife was unaccompanied by sufficiently corroborated
evidence of other acts contributing to her departure. Id. at 345-46, 210 S.E.2d at 150.
35. 210 Va. 608, 172 S.E.2d 724 (1970).
36. Evidence indicated that the husband was indifferent to his wife, that he cursed,
abused and physically assaulted her, and that he had violent outbursts of temper and de-
stroyed furniture. Id. at 616, 210 S.E.2d at 730.
326 [Vol. 15:321
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rule that the absenting of one spouse from the other after the commence-
ment and during the pendency of a suit for divorce is not an act upon
which a suit for desertion may be predicated. 7 The court held in Painter
v. Painter,s that it is of the utmost importance to the proper disposition
of a desertion claim that the date of the alleged desertion be established
because "one spouse is not guilty of legal desertion in separating from the
other after the institution of a suit for divorce or during its pendency. '' 3,
In Alls v. Ails,40 it was reversible error for the trial court to hold that the
wife's departure from the family domicile, after commencement of her
suit, constituted legal desertion.41
Virginia's divorce law has provided for divorce upon non-fault separa-
tion of the parties since 1960.42 Code section 20-91(9)(a) provides that,
upon application of either party, a court may decree a divorce for a hus-
band and wife who have lived separate and apart without any cohabita-
tion or interruption for one year." This partial abandonment of the fault
principle was motivated by a desire to avoid the harsh results of the re-
37. See Hudgins v. Hudgins, 181 Va. 81, 23 S.E.2d 774 (1943) (highly proper and com-
mendable that spouses separate); accord, Plattner v. Plattner, 202 Va. 263, 117 S.E.2d 128
(1960); Smith v. Smith, 202 Va. 104, 116 S.E.2d 110 (1960). See generally Annot., 98
A.L.R.2d 1264 (1964).
38. 215 Va. 418, 211 S.E.2d 37 (1975).
39. Id. at 421, 211 S.E.2d at 39.
40. 216 Va. 13, 216 S.E.2d 16 (1975).
41. The record indicated that the wife deserted her husband the day after her suit was
instituted and process was served on the husband. Id. at 14, 216 S.E.2d at 16-17.
42. 1960 Va. Acts, ch. 108 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (Repl. VoL 1975)). See
generally Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REv. 32 (1966).
Prior to 1960, a court could grant a divorce only after finding one of the parties at fault. The
present statute specifies that grounds for divorce include adultery, sodomy or buggery com-
mitted outside the marriage, cruelty or wilful desertion. Another ground for divorce which is
not, strictly speaking, a fault ground is conviction of a felony after the marriage and subse-
quent confinement for more than one year. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(1) to (8) (Repl. Vol.
1975).
43. VA. CoDE ANN. § 20-91(9)(a) (RepL VoL 1975). Although divorces obtained under
§ 20-91(9)(a) are commonly referred to as "no-fault" divorces, § 20-91(9)(a) is a non-fault
separation statute. Wadlington, supra note 42, at 68-69. Thus, the Virginia Supreme Court
has held that the party applying for the divorce need not be the innocent spouse and that a
husband who abandoned his wife could use § 20-91(9) to obtain a divorce. Canavos v.
Canavos, 205 Va. 744, 747, 139 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1965). However, fault concepts are still
prominent in Virginia in the area of alimony, and alimony (now maintenance support) can-
not be awarded to a spouse at fault. Wadlington, supra note 42, at 79. See notes 169-175
infra and accompanying text for discussion of alimony and divorces based upon non-fault
separation. (Divorces obtained under § 20-91(9) will hereinafter be referred to as non-fault
divorces.)
1981] 327
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crimination doctrine 44 and to remove from divorce proceedings the con-
flicts caused by the need to prove fault.4
The Virginia Supreme Court interpreted Code section 20-91(a) in sev-
eral noteworthy decisions during the past decade. In Graham v. Gra-
ham,46 and Johnson v. Johnson,'47 the court indirectly recommended that
a divorce based upon non-fault separation would be appropriate in cases
where neither party could sustain a divorce decree based on traditional
fault grounds.48 However, in Robertson v. Robertson,49 the court held that
a trial court was not required to grant a divorce under the two-year sepa-
ration statute (now one year) to the exclusion of all other proven
grounds.50 "We find nothing in Code § 20-91(9), or in any other portion of
the divorce law, which suggests legislative intent to give precedence to
one proven ground of divorce over another." 51
The court has upheld the public policy in favor of preserving marriages
through its interpretation of subdivision (a) of Code section 20-91(9).52 In
Moore v. Moore,63 the defendant-husband appealed the decree of the trial
court which permitted the plaintiff-wife to dismiss voluntarily her divorce
action for a "no fault" divorce.5 He contended that his wife was prohib-
44. Under the recrimination doctrine, no divorce could be granted if both parties were at
fault. See generally Comment, Recrimination and Comparatative Rectitude, 20 WASH. &
LEE L. Rav. 354 (1963).
45. Wadlington, supra note 42, at 66-67. § 20-91(9)(c) provides, in part, that a non-fault
divorce decree does not lessen a spouse's obligation to pay support and maintenance for his
or her spouse. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(c) (Repl. Vol. 1975). For discussion of non-fault
divorces and alimony, see notes 169-175 infra and accompanying text.
46. 210 Va. 608, 617, 172 S.E.2d 724, 730 (1970).
47. 213 Va. 204, 211, 191 S.E.2d 206, 211 (1972).
48. For discussion of the traditional grounds of divorce alleged in Graham and Johnson,
see notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
49. 215 Va. 425, 211 S.E.2d 41 (1975).
50. The husband filed a cross-bill for a non-fault divorce and contended on appeal that
the trial court erred in awarding his wife a divorce on the grounds of desertion and adultery.
He argued that the non-fault ground of divorce took precedence over the other divorce
grounds because the statutory separation period had become complete subsequent to his
desertion and acts of adultery. Id. at 426, 211 S.E.2d at 43.
51. Id. In dictum, the court stated that a cause of action for divorce under Code § 20-
91(9) was not subject to a plea of res judicata or recrimination with respect to any other
ground. Id. at 426-27, 211 S.E.2d at 43.
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9)(a) (Repl. VoL 1975) provides, in part, that a divorce from
the bond of matrimony may be decreed "[o]n the application of either party if and when
the husband and wife have lived separate and apart without any cohabitation and without
interruption for one year." (emphasis added).
53. 218 Va. 790, 240 S.E.2d 535 (1978).
54. A brief chronology of the facts is important. The wife sought a divorce from the bonds
of matrimony but asked for no ancillary relief. The husband's answer admitted the wife's
DOMESTIC RELATIONS NOTE
ited from voluntarily dismissing her action because the suit had already
been "submitted" to the chancellor for a ruling prior to the filing of her
motion to dismiss.55 His corollary argument was that he was entitled to
have the wife awarded a divorce because he had made an "application" in
the cause when it was "fully matured and submitted." 56
Interpreting the terms "submission" in Virginia's non-suit statute" and"application" in subdivision (a) of Code section 20-91(9),58 the supreme
court rejected both arguments. It held that the wife had an absolute right
to a voluntary dismissal in view of the fact that neither party had yielded
issues to the trial court for consideration and decision.59 The court also
held that the request by the husband for a decree in favor of the wife did
not amount to an "application" under code section 20-91(9)(a).60 "For
there to be an 'application' under this statute, the party applying must
himself seek affirmative relief by way of divorce in his favor through an
original divorce proceeding or through a cross-bill filed in a pending
suit."6 ' A close reading of Moore reveals that the decision was based on
the supreme court's perception of the potential inequity and abuses en-
gendered in the procedure suggested by the husband.6 2
allegations and averred that, except for the merits of the divorce, there were no issues for
the court to adjudicate. The cause was referred to a commissioner in chancery upon a decree
of reference endorsed by both parties. After depositions at which the husband and his attor-
ney did not appear, the commissioner reported that the ground for divorce had been proven.
He recommended that the wife be granted the divorce based on the parties' two-year sepa-
ration. The suit remained dormant for six months when the husband's attorney wrote the
chancellor and asked that a final decree be entered. The attorney enclosed a draft of a
decree, endorsed only by him, which provided for an absolute divorce to the wife on the
ground alleged in her bill. Within a week thereafter, the wife filed a motion to "dismiss" the
cause upon the ground "that she no longer wish[ed] to pursue the matter." The husband
then fied a motion seeking a hearing on the wife's motion and also asked to be heard on his"application" for entry of a final divorce decree. The trial court, following oral argument,
entered an order dismissing the wife's bill of complaint. Id. at 791-92, 240 S.E.2d at 535-36.
55. Id. at 793, 240 S.E.2d at 537.
56. Id. at 796, 240 S.E.2d at 538.
57. The husband relied on former VA. CODE ANN. § 8-220 (Repl. Vol. 1957) (current ver-
sion at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Repl VoL 1977)).
58. The term "application" is used in a different context in the merger statute which
allows the guilty party to move for merger. Under those circumstances, but unlike the facts
in Moore, a determination on the merits of the grounds for divorce would have already been
made. 218 Va. at 796, 240 S.E.2d at 539 n.6 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 20-121 (Repl. VoL
1975)).
59. 218 Va. at 796, 240 S.E.2d at 538.
60. Id. at 796, 240 S.E.2d at 538-39.
61. Id. at 796, 240 S.E.2d at 539.
62. While noting that the husband was seeking to force his wife to obtain a divorce
against her wishes, the court frowned on the potential application of the husband's
329
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2. Defenses to Divorce
Although there are numerous defenses to divorce, 3 the cases decided
by the Virginia Supreme Court during the 1970's primarily concerned
lack of corroboration. Code section 20-99 provides, in part, that no di-
vorce may be granted on the uncorroborated testimony of either of the
parties. The cause shall be heard independently of the admissions of
either party in the pleadings or otherwise." As previously discussed,6 5 the
supreme court applied this requirement strictly to deny divorce in Gra-
ham, Johnson, Aichner, Capps, Painter, and Rowland.
In McIlwain v. Mcllwain," the supreme court held that a self-serving
statement was not admissible under the res gestae exception to the hear-
say rule6 7 since the statement was made at least two hours after the al-
leged act and was merely a narrative account given by the wife to her
friend and confidante.6s Likewise, "even if [the statement was] admissi-
ble, it [was] not sufficient to afford the corroboration required within the
argument.
Carried to its logical conclusion in a "contested" divorce case, approval of the proce-
dure employed by this husband would permit the guilty party to force the innocent
one to be awarded a merits adjudication of divorce contrary to the innocent party's
desires when the guilty party himself had no grounds for a divorce in his favor. This
would indeed be a novel development in the law, given the public policy in favor of
preserving the marriage.
Id.
63. The classic defenses used in divorce litigation are collusion and condonation, conni-
vance and recrimination. However, the divorce action may be defeated by failure of jurisdic-
tional requirements (e.g., residence, domicile or venue), lack of corroboration, separation by
mutual consent, premature filing, application of the doctrine of res judicata, absence of
requisite intent, insanity, limitation of action, or the lack of a valid marriage. For a discus-
sion of the Virginia decisions in which these defenses have been litigated, see JOINT Commrr-
TEE ON CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR AND THE VIRGINIA BAR AssocIA-
TIoN, Virginia Lawyer's Handbook: Separation and Divorce 46-56 (1980 ed.) [hereinafter
cited as Separation and Divorce]. See generally CLARK, supra note 12, at §§ 12.8-12.12.
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-99 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
65. See notes 19-32 supra and accompanying text.
66. 215 Va. 633, 212 S.E.2d 284 (1975) (wife told neighbor that she had been struck by
her husband two hours earlier).
67:'Under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, spontaneous utterances at or im-
mediately after an event are held to be admissible. See McCoRaici's HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 289-90 (2d ed. 1972). The time interval is important in determining the
spontaneity of the utterance. See generally Portsmouth Transit Co. v. Brickhouse, 200 Va.
844, 847-48, 108 S.E.2d 385, 387-88 (1959) (statement made 20 minutes after event not ad-
missible); Kuckenbecker v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 619, 101 S.E.2d 523 (1958) (statement
made 30 to 50 minutes later held inadmissible).
68. 215 Va. at 636, 212 S.E.2d at 286.
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meaning of Code § 20-99." 9 McIlwain also involved the defense of condo-
nation. The court held that, after condonation, an incident or certain con-
duct7O could not be revived and relied upon as the basis for a divorce
unless it was revived by similar conduct.7 1
The defense of lack of intent is especially applicable to divorce sought
on the "no-fault" ground. In Hooker v. Hooker,72 the court interpreted
the words "separate and apart" in Cbde section 20-91(9) 71 to mean more
than a mere physical separation of the husband and wife. The court held
that the separation must be coupled with an intention by at least one of
the parties to live separate and apart permanently. This intention must
be shown to have existed at the beginning of the separation period.7 The
court's decision is in keeping with the general policy of preventing "ex-
tended separations required by other circumstances [to] ripen into
'instant divorce' without the salutory period of contemplation required by
the statute during which the parties have an opportunity for
reconciliation."75
3. Jurisdiction over Alimony, Child Support and Property
It is well established that jurisdiction in divorce suits is purely statu-
tory.76 In Virginia, such authority is found in Code section 20-107. This
section provides, in part, that upon decreeing the dissolution of a mar-
69. Id.
70. On one occasion, the husband excluded his wife and child from their home, locked her
out, and refused to permit her to get medicine for the child. The parties reconciled and
resumed their marital relations three weeks later. Id. at 634-35, 212 S.E.2d at 285.
71. Id. at 636-37, 212 S.E.2d at 286-87. The husband contended that his wife construc-
tively deserted him-by causing him to be excluded from the family home by an injunction.
Because the injunction became effective after she had instituted her divorce, the court held
she was not guilty of constructive desertion. Id. at 637, 212 S.E.2d at 287. See note 37 supra
and accompanying text.
72. 215 Va. 415, 211 S.E.2d 34 (1975).
73. See notes 42-56 supra and accompanying text for discussion of no-fault divorce in
Virginia.
74. The husband went to South Vietnam as a civilian employee of the United States
Army in 1970 and lived separate and apart from his wife thereafter. In 1972, he wrote to an
attorney in Richmond for the purpose of instituting divorce proceedings. Evidence indicated
that he initially accepted overseas employment for monetary reasons. 215 Va. at 416, 211
S.E.2d at 36.
75. Id. at 417, 211 S.E.2d at 36. See Otis v. Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 26 So.2d 146 (1946);
Sutherland v. Sutherland, 75 Nev. 304, 340 P.2d 581 (1959); Mallard v. Mallard, 234 N.C.
654, 68 S.E.2d 247 (1951); Beck v. Beck, 14 N.C.App. 163, 187 S.E.2d 355 (1972). See also
CLARK, supra note 12, at § 12.6; 24 AM. JuR. 2d, Divorce and Separation § 148 at 305 (1966).
76. Watkins v. Watkins, - Va. _, 265 S.E.2d 750, 752 (1980). See generally CLARK,
supra note 12 at § 11.2.
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riage and also upon decreeing a divorce,7 whether from the bond of mat-
rimony78 or from bed and board, 7 the court "may make such further de-
cree as it shall deem expedient concerning the maintenance and support
of the parties, or either of them, and the care, custody of their minor
children."80 While interpreting these provisions as well as those in Code
section 20.111,81 the supreme court both reaffirmed and extended estab-
lished Virginia precedent during the 1970's.
In Richardson v. Moore,82 the court reiterated its holding in Capell v.
Capells8 that the trial court retains jurisdiction respecting alimony until
the further order of the court. "[B]ecause it touches a public as well as a
marital duty, jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any agreement of the par-
ties in pais which the Court itself does not adopt and approve.""
In Werner v. Commonwealth,"5 the supreme court examined the inter-
relationship between the divorce jurisdiction of circuit courts 8 and juve-
nile and domestic courts with respect to support orders.87 The court held
77. In enacting this section, the legislature did not intend to make any distinction be-
tween decrees for the dissolution of a marriage and degrees annuling a marriage. Henderson
v. Henderson, 187 Va. 121, 46 S.E.2d 10 (1948). See notes 2-17 supra and accompanying
text for discussion of annulment.
78. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (Repl. VoL 1975).
79. A divorce from bed and board may be decreed for cruelty, reasonable apprehension of
bodily hurt, wilful desertion or abandonment. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-95 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
81. A decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony extinguishes contingent property
rights, e.g., dower and curtesy. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-111 (Repl. Vol. 1975). For discussion of
the court's jurisdiction over personal property in divorce suits, see notes 123-33 infra and
accompanying text.
82. 217 Va. 422, 229 S.E.2d 864 (1976).
83. 164 Va. 45, 178 S.E. 894 (1935).
84. 217 Va. at 423, 229 S.E.2d at 866. See also Casilear v. Casilear, 168 Va. 46, 190 S.E.
314 (1937).
85. 212 Va. 623, 186 S.E.2d 76 (1972). The husband petitioned for termination of alimony.
He contended that his wife lost her right to enforce the support order of the juvenile and
domestic relations court when she obtained a divorce decree from the circuit court without
having provision therein for alimony. Id. at 624, 186 S.E.2d at 77.
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-96 (Curn. Supp. 1980) provides that:
A. The circuit court, on the chancery side thereof, shall have jurisdiction of suits for
annulling or affirming marriages and for divorces.
B. The suit, in either case, shall be brought in the county or corporation in which the
parties last cohabitated, or at the option of the plaintiff, in the county or corporation
in which the defendant resides, if a resident of this State, and in cases in which an
order of publication may be issued against the defendant under § 8.01-316, venue
may also be in the county or city in which the plaintiff resides.
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61 (Cum. Supp. 1980) empowers juvenile and domestic relations
courts to impose criminal penalties upon a spouse who fails to support his or her spouse. VA.
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that a support order of a juvenile and domestic relations court continues
in full force and effect notwithstanding the entry by a court of record of a
divorce decree that was silent as to support.88 Under Code section 20-
79(a)89 the jurisdiction of the juvenile and domestic relations court ceases
only if a specific provision for allowance or denial of support is included
in the final divorce decree of the court of record. The court also noted
that juvenile and domestic relations district courts are particularly well
equipped to supervise the collection of support payments from recalci-
trant husbands, as evidenced by Code section 20-79(c).90
In three noteworthy cases,' 1 the Virginia Supreme Court focused on
CODE ANN. § 20-67 (Repl Vol. 1975) vests juvenile and domestic relations courts with exclu-
sive or original jurisdiction in nonsupport cases arising under chapter 5, Desertion and Non-
support, of title 20, Domestic Relations.
88. 212 Va. at 625, 186 S.E.2d at 78.
89. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-79(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides:
In any case where an order has been entered under the provisions of this chapter,
directing either party to pay any sum or sums of money for the support of his or her
spouse, or concerning the care, custody or maintenance of any child, or children, the
jurisdiction of the court which entered such order shall cease and its orders become
inoperative upon the entry of a decree by the court or the judge thereof in vacation in
a suit for divorce instituted in any circuit court in this State having jurisdiction
thereof, in which decree provision is made for support and maintenance for the
spouse or concerning the care, custody or maintenance of a child or children, or con-
cerning any matter provided in a decree in the divorce proceedings in accordance
with the provisions of § 20-103.
90. 212 Va. at 626, 186 S.E.2d at 78. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-79(c) (Cur. Supp. 1980)
provides:
[T]hat in any suit for divorce or suit for maintenance and support the court may
after a hearing, pendente lite, or in decree of divorce a mensa et thoro, decree of
divorce a vinculo matrimonii, final decree for maintenance and support, or subse-
quent decree in such suit, transfer to the juvenile and domestic relations district
court the enforcement of its orders pertaining to support and maintenance for the
spouse, maintenance, support, care and custody of the child or children. After the
entry of a decree of divorce a vinculo matrimonii the court may transfer to the juve-
nile and domestic relations district court any other matters pertaining to support and
maintenance for the spouse, maintenance, support, care and custody of the child or
children on motion by either party, and may so transfer such matters before the entry
of such decree on motion joined in by both parties. An appeal of an order by such
juvenile and domestic relations district court which is to enforce or modify the decree
in the divorce suit shall be as provided in § 16.1-214.
See also Poole v. Poole, 210 Va. 442, 171 S.E.2d 685 (1970) (juvenile and domestic courts
have exclusive statutory jurisdiction on question of custody).
91. Newport v. Newport, 219 Va. 48, 245 S.E.2d 134 (1978); Osborne v. Osborne, 215 Va.
205, 207 S.E.2d 875 (1974) (Virginia Supreme Court will recognize the validity of another
court's adjudication of marital status); Romeo v. Romeo, 218 Va. 290, 237 S.E.2d 143 (1977)
(Virginia Supreme Court refused to relitigate the question of the validity of a marriage be-
cause it had already been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction).
1981]
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foreign decrees of absolute divorce and the concept of divisible divorce
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Estin v. Estin,92 Kreiger
v. Kreiger,s Armstrong v. Armstrong," and Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt.5
The divisible divorce concept is applicable when the foreign divorce has
been obtained in an ex parte proceeding,9 6 and it separates the issues of
divorce and property rights upon dissolution of the marital status.97 The
principle allows a court to dissolve the marital status in an uncontested
proceeding but preserves the right of a spouse not subject to that court's
jurisdiction to seek support payments.98
Osborne v. Osborne99 involved a foreign decree of absolute divorce that
provided for compensation to the wife and children in a manner and de-
gree different from an award under Virginia law.100 The Virginia Supreme
92. 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
93. 334 U.S. 555 (1948).
94. 350 U.S. 568 (1956).
95. 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
96. Osborne v. Osborne, 215 Va. 205, 210, 207 S.E.2d 875, 881. The United States Su-
preme Court has recognized that states can grant divorces unilaterally. "[E]ach state, by
virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of mar-
riage, can alter within its own borders the marriage status of the spouse domiciled there,
even though the other spouse is absent." Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99
(1942). For a general discussion of foreign decrees, see CLARK, supra note 12, at § 11.2; A.
PHELPS, DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN VIRGA, §§ 16-1 to 16-5 (3d ed. 1977).
97. The Virginia Supreme Court recognized the divisible divorce concept in Isaacs v.
Isaacs, 115 Va. 562, 79 S.E. 1072 (1913) to uphold a wife's right to alimony awarded before
the entry of a final divorce decree in a foreign jurisdiction. The court recognized the foreign
decree as a final dissolution of the marriage but declined to give it effect as to termination of
the lien for past and future installments of alimony payable under the Virginia decree. Id. at
569, 79 S.E. at 1074. See also Isaacs v. Isaacs, 117 Va. 730, 86 S.E. 105 (1915). For discussion
of division of personal and marital property upon divorce, see notes 123-31 infra and accom-
panying text. For discussion of enforcement of foreign divorce and support decrees, see
notes 290-300 infra and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957), where the wife filed for sup-
port payments in New York after the husband had secured an ex parte divorce. The Su-
preme Court stated: "Since the wife was not subject to its jurisdiction, the Nevada divorce
court had no power to extinguish any right which she had under the law of New York to
financial support from her husband." Id. at 418. See generally 24 Ahs. Jun. 2d, Divorce and
Separation, § 953; Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 1266 (1973); Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1303 at § 3 (1953).
99. 215 Va. 205, 207 S.E.2d 875 (1974).
100. The parties were married in Virginia and subsequently moved to Texas. After their
separation, the wife and children returned to Virginia. The husband filed for divorce in
Texas and was able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over his wife in Texas. The wife then
sued for a divorce in Virginia; she was also able to acquire in personam jurisdiction over her
husband. The Virginia court denied his plea in abatement (which asserted that all matters
in controversy should be adjudicated in the Texas court) and awarded temporary child cus-
tody and alimony to the wife. The wife discharged her counsel in Texas and did not appear
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Court held that a Texas decree awarding the husband a divorce and di-
viding property between the husband and wife was entitled to full faith
and credit under the United States Constitution01 and federal 12 and Vir-
ginia statutes"0 3 not only as to the wife's marital status, but also as to her
rights to property and support.1' Thus, the Texas decree terminated the
Virginia trial court's award of alimony pendente lite to the wife,10 5 and it
precluded the Virginia trial court from awarding the wife permanent
alimony.106
Although the supreme court discussed Isaacs v. Isaacs,10 7 and the
United States Supreme Court cases on divisible divorce,10 8 it distin-
guished those cases from the facts in Osborne. The court noted that the
Texas final decree of divorce was entered before, rather than after, per-
manent alimony was decreed by the trial court in Virginia. 109 The decree
was conclusive and unmodifiable because Texas had personal jurisdiction
over Mrs. Osborne and she was given an opportunity to protect her mari-
tal rights. Since the Texas courts would not permit relitigation of the is-
in person or by counsel at the trial. The Texas court granted the husband an absolute di-
vorce accompanied by a child support award to the wife smaller than the pendente lite
Virginia award. Since Texas is a community property state, the parties' community property
was divided in lieu of awarding alimony to the wife for her maintenance and support. The
husband filed a second plea in abatement in the Virginia court as he sought the settlement
of all matters in controversy with the Texas decree. The Virginia trial court only recognized
the decree as to the dissolution of the parties' marital status and it continued to exercise
jurisdiction over affairs of child custody and alimony. After the final decree awarded the
wife separate monthly stipends for permanent alimony and child support, the husband ef-
fectuated an appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court. Id. at 206-07, 207 S.E.2d at 878-79.
101. U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 1 provides in pertinent part: "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each state to the... judicial proceedings of every other State.. .. "
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "[J]udicial proceedings... shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States... as they have
by law or usage in the courts of [the] State ... from which they are taken."
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-389(B) (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides: "Every court of this Com-
monwealth shall give such records of courts not of this Commonwealth the full faith and
credit given to them in the courts of the jurisdiction from whence they come."
104. Despite the significant distinctions in the assets that could be used, the available
flexibility and the duration of the award, the court concluded that the Texas scheme of
economic adjustment upon the dissolution of marriage sought to protect the same right as
the award of alimony in Virginia. 215 Va. at 210, 207 S.E.2d at 880.
105. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (RepL Vol. 1975). For a discussion of decisions regard-
ing temporary or pendente lite support and maintenance, see notes 203-04 infra and accom-
panying text.
106. 215 Va. at 211, 207 S.E.2d at 882.
107. 115 Va. 562, 79 S.E. 1072 (1913) rev'd on other grounds, 117 Va. 730, 86 S.E. 105
(1915).
108. See notes 91-97 supra and accompanying text.
109. 215 Va. at 211, 207 S.E.2d at 881.
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sue of support due to the principle of res judicata, Virginia courts were
bound by the Texas decision and the wife could not be permitted to reli-
tigate in Virginia a right already determined by the Texas court.110
The court took a different posture regarding the increase in the amount
of the child support beyond that ordered by the Texas court."1 It de-
clined to give full faith and credit to a child support order entered in
another state as the result of uncontested proceedings.21 "[H]aving juris-
diction of the parties and of their minor children, [a Virginia court] may
make a child support award without being bound by any previous award
that may have been made in another state."'113 The supreme court further
held that, since Virginia courts can make independent determinations of
proper payments for child support, no proof of change of circumstances
was required before the trial court could make a child support award
which differed from the Texas child support decree.11 4
Newport v. Newport115 decided the question left open by the Virginia
Supreme Court in Osborne: whether the prior grant of an ex parte di-
vorce from another state extinguished a spouse's right to seek alimony. 1 6
After her husband was awarded an ex parte divorce in Nevada, Mrs.
Newport filed a bill of complaint against her husband in the Circuit Court
of Fairfax County, Virginia for separate support and maintenance. The
trial court accorded full faith and credit to the divorce decree insofar as it
terminated the marital status of the parties, but held that the Nevada
110. Id. at 212, 207 S.E.2d 880-81.
111. The husband contended that the Virginia court had no power, in the absence of a
changed circumstance, to increase the amount of child support beyond that ordered in the
Texas decree. Id. at 212, 207 S.E.2d at 882.
112. The court noted that the Virginia court had jurisdiction over the parties to enter
decrees awarding custody of the children and child support to the mother, and that such
decrees were entered before the Texas divorce decree was entered. The record also indicated
that the Texas court gave no consideration or effect to the Virginia decrees during the un-
contested proceedings. Likewise, the children resided with their mother in Virginia through-
out the litigation and the Virginia court never surrendered jurisdiction over them. Id. at
212-13, 207 S.E.2d at 882.
113. Id. at 213, 207 S.E.2d at 882. The court also noted that it was not required to give
full faith and credit to a child custody decree of another state. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107
(Curn. Supp. 1980). For a discussion of child support orders, see notes 268-89 infra and
accompanying text.
114. 215 Va. at 213, 207 S.E.2d at 882. For a discussion of the constitutional questions
raised by Osborne concerning the effect of full faith and credit in regard to modifiable de-
crees, see Domestic Relations, 1974-1975 Virginia Survey, 61 VA. L. REv. 1732, 1738-39
(1975) [hereinafter cited as 1974-1975 Virginia Survey].
115. 219 Va. 48, 245 S.E.2d 134 (1978).
116. The Newport court indicated that this question had been left undecided in Osborne.
Id. at 54, 245 S.E.2d at 139.
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court was without power to adjudicate the question of alimony between
the parties and that the decree dissolving the marriage did not terminate
the wife's right to support.11
Relying on the line of cases concerning divisible divorce which had
been adopted by the United States Supreme Court,""8 the Virginia Su-
preme Court rejected the husband's contention that the Virginia courts
lacked authority in a later proceeding to order payment of permanent
alimony under Virginia law.119 The court adopted the concept of divisible
divorce and held that the right of a wife to support "survives an absolute
divorce obtained by her husband in an ex parte proceeding in another
state. 1 20
In many respects, the decision of the Virginia Supreme Court that ali-
mony could not be extinguished without personal jurisdiction over both
parties was founded on equitable22 and public policy considerations.1 22
The court properly applied the divisible divorce concept to protect the
state's interest in regulating and supervising marital relationships as well
as to ensure that the spouse may secure a proper judicial determination
117. Id. at 49, 245 S.E.2d at 135. Compare with Jones v. Richardson, 320 F. Supp. 929
(W.D. Va. 1970) (foreign divorce decree which superseded Virginia support order did not
render support order ineffective because only Virginia divorce decrees nullify Virginia sup-
port orders, pursuant to §§ 20-74, -79).
118. The court in Newport cited extensively from Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416,
418-19 (1957), Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568, 577 (1956) and Estin v. Estin, 334
U.S. 541, 546-47, 549 (1948). The facts in Vanderbilt more nearly paralleled the facts in
Newport. 219 Va. at 51, 245 S.E.2d at 137.
119. The husband claimed that the Virginia trial court was required to accord full faith
and credit to the Nevada divorce decree and was precluded from awarding the wife perma-
nent alimony. 219 Va. at 49, 245 S.E.2d at 135.
120. Id. at 54, 245 S.E.2d at 139. The Newport court, in dictum stressed the duty of a
husband to support his wife, and the wife's inherent right to receive such support. Id. at 55-
56, 245 S.E.2d at 139. In light of the holding of Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (Alabama
divorce statute which allowed alimony awards to wives but not to husbands held unconstitu-
tional), it is reasonable to assume that future opinions of the Virginia Supreme Court will
not rely on such now unconstitutional albeit historically recognized rationales. "Given the
sexually neutral language of Virginia's revised spouse and child support statutes, Newport
requires equal protection of the husband's rights in ex parte proceedings." Separation and
Divorce, supra note 63, at 110-14.
121. Inequities result when a spouse, after establishing domicile in another state, can uni-
laterally terminate the marital status as well as the right of the other spouse to receive
support and maintenance. Such an inequitable result occurred in Stambaugh v. Stambaugh,
458 Pa. 147, 329 A.2d 483 (1974), where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that an ex
parte divorce decree procured by the husband in a foreign jurisdiction precluded a wife's
subsequent suit for alimony because Pennsylvania law made no provision for an ex-wife to
receive permanent alimony from her husband.
122. 219 Va. at 55, 245 S.E.2d at 139 (quoting Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1948)).
19811
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on the question of support and maintenance payments.
Virginia remains a member of a shrinking minority of states which do
not permit equitable division of personalty upon divorce. 12 The supreme
court has interpreted the language of Code section 20-107 to deny trial
courts jurisdiction in divorce suits to enter decrees affecting property
rights save those created by marriage in and to the real estate of the
parties.124
In Guy v. Guy, 25 the court held that the trial court lacked potential
jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding to decide the issue of ownership of
furniture and furnishings of a home. 2e Interpreting a legislative amend-
ment to Code section 20-107,'27 the court found that the "General Assem-
123. As of mid-1978, there were only seven common law property states (as opposed to
community property states such as Texas and California) where courts had no general or
equitable power to distribute property;, title alone controlled, subject to constructive trusts
and tracing of equitable title. These states were Florida, Mississippi, New York, Penn-
sylvania, Tennessee (jointly held property may be equitably distributed), Virginia, and West
Virginia. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of 1978, 13 F A. L.Q.
105, 116-17 (1979). Although Freed and Foster list South Carolina as one of 37 common law
property states where courts have equitable jurisdiction to distribute property, a recent
newspaper article included South Carolina in the remaining four states where courts have
no general or equitable power to distribute property. Mississippi, Virginia and West Virginia
are the other members of this declining minority. Jackson, Women's Property Rights, Rich-
mond Times-Dispatch, Sept. 28, 1980, § A, at 1, col. 2. See generally 24 AM. JuR. 2d at
§§ 925-29.
124. Watkins v. Watkins, - Va. _ 265 S.E.2d 750 (1980) (court lacked jurisdiction to
determine and settle daughter's right to securities held by her father); Jackson v. Jackson,
211 Va. 718, 180 S.E.2d 500 (1971) (trial court had no power to award use of jointly held
property of the parties to the wife as a part of alimony and child support award); Guy v.
Guy, 210 Va. 536, 172 S.E.2d 735 (1970) (trial court lacked potential jurisdiction to decide
issue of ownership of furniture and furnishings of family home). Contra, Bryan v. Bryan,
242 Ga. 121, 249 S.E.2d 605 (1978) (evidence authorized award of jointly held personal prop-
erty to husband in divorce action); Hargrett v. Hargrett, 242 Ga. 725, 251 S.E.2d 235 (1978)
(jointly owned property may be partitioned in divorce action by the court as in an equitable
proceeding); Morris v. Morris, 268 S.C. 104, 232 S.E.2d 326 (1977) (wife entitled to one-half
interest in furniture and fixtures in marital residence); Newsome v. Newsome, 43 N.C. App.
580, 259 S.E.2d 577 (1979) (wife entitled to right to possession of all the parties' household
effects and appliances); Holloway v. Holloway, 233 Ga. 631, 212 S.E.2d 809 (1975) (evidence
permitted jury to find in divorce action that monies in safe deposit box belonged to both
husband and wife and verdict dividing monies on deposit equally was not an illegal award of
alimony to the husband).
125. 210 Va. 536, 172 S.E.2d 735 (1970).
126. The trial court decreed that all the furniture and furnishings of the marital home,
worth approximately $50,000.00, were the sole property of the wife. Id. at 540, 172 S.E.2d at
738.
127. The 1962 General Assembly amended § 20-107 by adding these words: "The word'estate' as used in this section shall be construed to mean only those rights of the parties
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bly did not intend to confer on courts jurisdiction in a divorce suit to
enter a decree affecting property rights save those created by the mar-
riage in the real estate of the parties. Such jurisdiction having been with-
held. . . it cannot be conferred by consent or waiver.'1 2 8
The Virginia Supreme Court has modified the holding in Guy by al-
lowing lump sum awards for the purpose of furnishing and equipping a
wife's new residence.129 Also, in 1977, the General Assembly deleted the
term "estate" from code section 20-107 and gave trial courts discretionary
authority to award lump sum payments "based upon consideration of the
property interests of the parties except those acquired by gift or inheri-
tance during the marriage.' 30
Despite these changes, however, the recent case of Watkins v. Wat-
kins, 131 illustrates that Virginia trial courts still have no authority in di-
vorce actions to divide personal property acquired outside the marriage.
In Watkins, the chancellor entered a final divorce decree, and, as part of
the maintenance and support provisions for the wife, enjoined the hus-
band from disposing of his shares of stock in two family owned corpora-
tions.1 3 2 While voiding the part of the final decree dealing with the hus-
band's stock, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the chancellor was
without jurisdiction to enjoin the husband from disposing of his stock and
that the effect of the chancellor's directive was to impound improperly
the husband's personal property. 3 8
created by the marriage in and to the real property of each other," (e.g., dower and curtesy):
This amendment was in reaction to the court's holding in Smith v. Smith, 200 Va. 77, 104
S.E.2d 17 (1958) (trial court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the ownership of real and per-
sonal properties jointly and equally owned).
128. 210 Va. at 541, 172 S.E.2d at 738-39. One commentator surmised that the legislature
prefers a rule such as Guy in order to protect the interests of third parties who are not
before the court in the divorce proceeding. Holt, Support v. Alimony in Virginia: It's Time
to Use the Revised Statutes, 12 U. RICH. L. REv. 139, 150-51 (1977).
129. Turner v. Turner, 213 Va. 42, 43-44, 189 S.E.2d 361, 363 (1972) (court may award a
lump sum payment in addition to regular payments so that deserving spouse can furnish a
residence upon divorce). Furthermore, a court can order the deserting spouse to replace any
furniture removed from the apartment by him with a "suitable" substitute. Robertson v.
Robertson, 215 Va. 425, 430, 211 S.E.2d 41, 45-46 (1975). See notes 198-201 infra and ac-
companying text for discussion of lump sum payments.
130. 1977 Va. Acts, ch. 475 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1980)). See
also Holt, supra note 128, at 151-52.
131. - Va. ., 265 S.E.2d 750 (1980).
132. Id. at _, 265 S.E.2d at 752.
133. Id. at., 265 S.E.2d at 752-53. See also Cooper v. Spencer, 218 Va. 541, 238 S.E.2d
805 (1977), where the Virginia Supreme Court considered the question whether a partner-
ship existed between a man and woman who had lived together as husband and wife and
whether the woman was entitled to a statement and settlement of accounts. The court held
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4. Separation Agreements and Property Settlements
This topic was the source of numerous decisions by the Virginia Su-
preme Court during the past decade.134 Virginia law permits a divorcing
couple to execute a separation agreement regulating the post-divorce dis-
position of property or other matters. Code section 20-109.1 provides that
such an agreement may be incorporated into the final divorce decree.1 85 It
is the established rule in Virginia that separation agreements"3 6 intro-
duced into divorce proceedings that are confirmed, approved, and ratified
will be considered contracts and not alimony.1 37 Commentators have
noted that this rule "places a heavy burden on the drafters either to an-
ticipate the many eventualities which may arise and specifically deal with
them, or to provide for reopening or renegotiating all or some contractual
that the woman had the burden of proving the existence of an implied business partnership
agreement since there was no express partnership agreement. The fact that she jointly
owned farm property and may have shared gross returns of commercial egg business and
farming operations was held to be insufficient to establish an implied business partnership.
134. Cooley v. Cooley, - Va. _, 263 S.E.2d 49 (1980) (postnuptial separation agree-
ment and subsequent contract); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 218 Va. 599, 238 S.E.2d 817 (1977)
(separation agreement modified by consent decree); Shoosmith v. Scott, 217 Va. 290, 227
S.E.2d 729 (1976), aff'd on rehearing, 217 Va. 789, 232 S.E.2d 787 (1977) (separation and
property settlement agreement); Harris v. Harris, 217 Va. 680, 232 S.E.2d 739 (1977) (con-
tract ratified and confirmed by decree a vinculo matrimonii); Thomas v. Thomas, 217 Va.
502, 229 S.E.2d 887 (1976) (postnuptial contract); Thomas v. Thomas, 216 Va. 741, 222
S.E.2d 557 (1976) (stipulation agreement); Morris v. Morris, 216 Va. 457, 219 S.E.2d 864
(1975) (settlement agreement executed during pendency of divorce); Capps v. Capps, 216
Va. 378, 219 S.E.2d 901 (1975) (separation agreement concerning divorce); Wickham v.
Wickham, 215 Va. 694, 213 S.E.2d 750 (1975) (separation agreement); McLoughlin v. Mc-
Loughlin, 211 Va. 365, 177 S.E.2d 781 (1970) (property settlement agreement).
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109
(Cum. Supp. 1980).
136. Inter-spousal agreements formed before marriage are "antenuptial", those formed
during marital harmony are "postnuptial", and those formed in immediate contemplation or
during separation are separation agreements. 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMNNTS AND
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 3, at 3-6 (1978).
137. Thomas v. Thomas, 216 Va. 741, 222 S.E.2d 557 (1976) (when a stipulation agree-
ment is filed and no objection is raised, trial court's jurisdiction over awarding alimony, suit
money or counsel fees is restricted to terms of stipulation agreement); McLoughlin v. Mc-
Loughlin, 211 Va. 365, 368, 177 S.E.2d 781, 783 (1970) (payments made pursuant to a prop-
erty settlement agreement that was incorporated into a divorce decree cannot be judicially
eliminated or modified as can alimony payments); accord, Harris v. Harris, 217 Va. 680, 232
S.E.2d 739 (1977).
In 1977, the General Assembly amended the statute that allowed a party to object to a
property settlement when the agreement was introduced in the divorce court. The amend-
ment forbids objection to the agreement in court. 1972 Va. Acts, ch. 222 (codified at VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-109 (Cum. Supp. 1980)).
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provisions at certain times or on the occurrence of certain events.' 1 3 8
Shoosmith v. Scott 3 9 "emphasize[d] the inviolability of separation
agreements and should serve as notice to practitioners to draft them care-
fully and completely." 10 In Shoosmith, the court held that retroactive
application of amendments to code sections 20-109 and 20-109(1) was un-
constitutional as applied to a prior property settlement."14 Since the di-
vorce decree approved a contract between the parties but did not incor-
porate the contract or order the husband to perform its obligations, it was
not an award of alimony. "Rather, the decree was an approval of a private
bilateral contract based upon mutual consideration for payments in lieu
of alimony. Like other private contracts, such contracts may not be im-
paired by legislative enactment."'"4 2
It is well settled in Virginia that a consent decree which contains provi-
sions of a previous property settlement agreement supersedes the agree-
ment and is binding upon the parties. "A consent decree is a contract or
agreement between the parties to the suit, entered of record in the cause
with the consent of the court, and [it] is binding unless secured by fraud
or mistake.""1 In Lindsay v. Lindsay," the court held that the introduc-
138. See Domestic Relations, 1976-1977 Virginia Survey, 63 V, L. REv. 1418, 1420 n.17
(1977) (quoting Wadlington, Separation and Settlement Agreements in Virginia: Drafting
for Future Modification, 3 VA. BAR J. 4, 8 n.15 (Winter 1977)) [hereinafter cited as 1976-
1977 Virginia Survey].
139. 217 Va. 789, 232 S.E.2d 787 (1977), aff'g 217 Va. 290, 227 S.E.2d 729 (1976). The case
was heard twice because the court erroneously referred to the agreement as alimony at one
point. In the second Shoosmith opinion, the court affirmed the rationale of its prior holding
and noted that the agreement was a contract rather than alimony. 217 Va. at 793, 232
S.E.2d at 789.
140. 1976-1977 Virginia Survey, supra note 138, at 1420.
141. The husband and wife executed a property settlement after their divorce in 1959.
The chancellor "approved" the settlement but it was not made an express part of his decree.
The General Assembly passed amendments to the code which provided that alimony was to
cease if the person receiving the payment remarried or died. Even though the amendments
were passed after his wife's remarriage and the agreement did not state that payments
would cease if she remarried, Shoosmith contended that the amended provisions ended his
obligation to continue payment to his remarried former wife. 217 Va. at 791-93, 232 S.E.2d
at 788-89. See 1977 Va. Acts, ch. 222 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (Cum. Supp.
1980)).
142. 217 Va. at 793, 232 S.E.2d at 789. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1 ("No State shall
... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts... ."); VA. CONST. art. I, § 11
("[T]he General Assembly shall not pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts
... ."); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (impairment will be up-
held if necessary to achieve state's purpose and reasonable under the circumstances); El
Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965) (impairment upheld because it did not involve the"primary consideration" of the contract).
143. Durrett v. Durrett, 204 Va. 59, 63, 129 S.E.2d 50, 52-53 (1963). See also Barnes v.
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tion of an original property settlement agreement "for evidentiary pur-
poses only" did not constitute a repudiation of a consent decree or evi-
dence an intent to be bound by the terms of the original agreement.
Therefore, the trial court had the authority to modify the support and
property settlement by consent decree and to incorporate the modified
agreement into a final decree of divorce. 145
The Supreme Court of Virginia held in Morris v. Morris,146 that the
purpose of code section 20-109.1 is to facilitate enforcement of the terms
of settlement agreements by the contempt power of the court. Refusing to
narrowly construe the language of code section 20-109.1,147 the supreme
court concluded that any provision of a separation agreement that "rea-
sonably relate[s] to the maintenance and care of the children" can be-
come part of a divorce decree .14  The Morris decision thus enhances the
ability of courts to enforce the provisions of separation agreements incor-
porated in divorce decrees. It also signifies that the supreme court will
encourage voluntary, court-approved agreements which effectuate the
American Fertilizer Co., 144 Va. 692, 720, 130 S.E. 902, 911 (1925).
144. 218 Va. 599, 603, 238 S.E.2d 817, 819 (1977). The parties submitted a consent decree
to the trial court, and the wife introduced a previous separation agreement for evidentiary
purposes only. Relying on the consent decree, the court modified certain provisions of the
separation agreement in incorporating the provisions into the final decree. The husband
contended that the original agreement should have been binding on the wife because she
reinstated the agreement by introducing it at trial. He also argued that the trial court lacked
authority to modify the agreement, pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (Repl. Vol. 1975)
(current version at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (Cum. Supp. 1980)). 218 Va. at 600-03, 238
S.E.2d at 817-19.
145. 218 Va. at 603-04, 238 S.E.2d at 819-20. This decision emphasizes the importance of
drafting separation agreements carefully and the need to be explicit in stating what parts of
the agreement are to be incorporated into the final decree and what areas are to be left to
the court's discretion. See Domestic Relations, 1977-1978 Virginia Survey, 64 VA. L. Rv.
1439, 1441 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1977-1978 Virginia Survey].
146. 216 Va. 457, 459, 219 S.E.2d 864, 866-67 (1975).
147. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109.1 (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides in relevant part: "Any court
may affirm, ratify and incorporate by reference in its decree ... any valid agreement
between the parties, or provisions thereof, concerning the conditions of the maintenance of
the parties, or either of them and the care, custody and maintenance of their minor
children. .. ."
148. 216 Va. at 459, 219 S.E.2d at 867. The trial court declined to "enforce, interpret or
rule upon" provisions of the separation agreement that were not expressly related to "child
custody, visitation and support, or alimony." The excluded provisions required the husband
to convey or transfer to his wife his interest in the family residence, furniture, furnishings,
and automobile and to maintain life insurance for the children. Other provisions concerned
tax deductions and independent legal advice. Id. at 459-60, 219 S.E.2d 866-67. Agreements
containing similar provisions were incorporated into divorce decrees without question in
Carter v. Carter, 215 Va. 475, 477, 211 S.E.2d 253, 255-56 (1975) and Paul v. Paul, 214 Va.
651, 653, 203 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1974).
342 [Vol. 15:321
DOMESTIC RELATIONS NOTE
prompt resolution of disputes concerning the maintenance and care of
minor children and the property rights of divorcing spouses. "
Traditionally, courts have held that antenuptial agreements which con-
templated separation and divorce were invalid as against public policy. 50
This almost universal "public policy" rule holds:
Any antenuptial contract which provides for, facilitates, or tends to induce,
a separation or divorce of the parties after marriage, is contrary to public
policy, and is therefore void. It has often been held that an antenuptial
agreement limiting the liability of the husband to the wife [or vice versa] for
alimony, or fixing the property rights of the parties, in the event of a sepa-
ration or divorce, is void.151
As with most jurisdictions, Virginia has followed this general rule.15 2
The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, has recently taken a more
progressive view of antenuptial and postnuptial contracts relating to the
adjustment of property rights between spouses. In Capps v. Capps,25 3 the
court upheld the validity of a postnuptial agreement relating to the dis-
position of real property. '
Although the supreme court restated its general opposition to antenup-
tial or postnuptial agreements which tended to encourage or facilitate
separation or divorce,155 it also noted that "property settlements, when
entered into by competent parties upon valid consideration for lawful
149. 216 Va. 457, 459, 219 S.E.2d 864, 867 (1975). The court is in line with the modem
judicial trend of facilitating the settlement of marital dissolutions through agreements made
upon or after separation. See 1 A. LmwNy, supra note 136, § 3, at 3-23 to 3-24 (citing, inter
alia, Ryan v. Griffin, 199 Va. 891, 103 S.E.2d 240 (1958)); 2 A. INsvY, SEPARAMON AGREE-
MENrs AND ANTE-Num.AL CoNTRAcTs § 90, at 90-27 (1979). For an extensive analysis of
antenuptial agreements, see Swisher, Divorce Planning in Antenuptial Agreements: Toward
a New Objectivity, 13 U. RiCm. L. Rzv. 175 (1979).
150. Swisher, supra note 149, at 177.
151. Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288, 293 (1964) (quoting 17 Am.
Jun., Divorce and Separation § 16 (1957)).
152. Arrington v. Arrington, 196 Va. 86, 82 S.E.2d 548 (1954); Cumming v. Cumming, 127
Va. 16, 102 S.E. 575 (1920). For similar decisions of other states, see Swisher, supra note
149, at 177-78, n.7. See also Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 942 (1958); Annot., 70 A.L.R. 826 (1931).
153. 216 Va. 378, 219 S.E.2d 901 (1975).
154. The parties had executed a written agreement prior to their separation. It called for
the wife to assume joint liability on a promissory note in exchange for joint title in the
marital home. The agreement further provided that if either party should file a suit for
divorce or separate maintenance, the wife would surrender her interest in the property and
the husband would idemnify his wife's liability on the note. And, as the court noted, the
agreement stated that the parties were living together as husband and wife with no prospect
of a separation. Id. at 379, 219 S.E.2d at 902-03.
155. Id. at 380, 219 S.E.2d at 903.
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purposes, are favored in the law and [such will be enforced] unless their
illegality is clear and certain. ' 15e Thus, the court held that the agreement
did not violate public policy because it tended to promote a continuation
of the marriage, rather than encouraging or facilitating a divorce or
separation.157
The Capps decision was affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court in a
recent 1980 case. In Cooley v. Cooley,"" the court considered the question
whether a postnuptial agreement and a subsequent contract modifying
the agreement were void and'unenforceable as facilitating divorce.159 Em-
phasizing that the parties had experienced marital difficulties for nearly
three years before its execution, the supreme court found that the agree-
ment was merely an attempt by an estranged couple to adjust mutual
rights and obligations prior to their actual separation, which took place
immediately.160
As to the contract modifying the agreement, evidence indicated that
the ground for the divorce preexisted the contract and had already be-
come irrevocably fixed. 61 Consequently, the court held that the postnup-
tial agreement and subsequent contract were not void and unenforceable
since "the general purpose of the contract, like the agreement, was to ad-
just the [parties'] property rights; facilitation of the divorce was not its
specific object."16 2 Although these cases may be open to analytical criti-
cism,161 the substantive import of Capps and Cooley nonetheless merit
commendation because the Virginia Supreme Court has decided to follow
the progressive trend of jurisdictions that allow married couples to plan
for divorce.""
156. Id.
157. 216 Va. at 380, 219 S.E.2d at 903. The parties in this suit were the same as those in
Capps v. Capps, 216 Va. 382, 219 S.E.2d 898 (1975). For a discussion of another aspect of
this case, see note 29 supra and accompanying text.
158. - Va. -, 263 S.E.2d 49 (1980).
159. Id. at - 263 S.E.2d at 50.
160. The husband and wife recognized that a separation was unavoidable. The preamble
of the agreement even recited the "unhappy" conditions and the necessity to separate for
"the health and happiness" of both parties. Id. at -, 263 S.E.2d at 52.
161. The wife had no defense to the husband's one-year separation charge and she had
promised not to contest the issue of spousal support at the divorce proceeding in considera-
tion for modification of the original agreement. Id. at - 263 S.E.2d at 52.
162. Id. at -, 263 S.E.2d at 52.
163. See Domestic Relations, 1975-1976 Virginia Survey, 62 VA. L. REv. 1431, 1436-37
(1976) [hereinafter cited as 1975-1976 Virginia Survey].
164. See Swisher, supra note 149, at 183-95.
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5. Alimony or Support and Maintenance of Spouse
The term "alimony" is derived from the Latin atimonia, "suste-
nance."' " As traditionally applied by the Virginia Supreme Court, it
meant the sustenance or support of the wife by the divorced husband. "It
stems from the common law right of the wife to support by her husband,
which right, unless the wife by her own misconduct forfeits it, continued
to exist even after they cease to live together." 16 Prior to 1975, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court consistently held that alimony was a substantive
right of the wife.1e7 However, several decisions based on recent amend-
ments by the General Assembly indicate that the court has altered this
traditional view and that alimony is no longer an absolute right of a wife
upon divorce. 1"
The Virginia Supreme Court has reaffirmed its rule that a wife cannot
obtain alimony (now called support and maintenance 69 ) when her hus-
band is granted a divorce on the basis of the wife's misconduct.1 7 0 As of
1978, Virginia was one of ten jurisdictions (including Puerto Rico) which
still considers marital misconduct an automatic bar to alimony.1 7 1 It
165. Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 338, 10 S.E.2d 893, 897 (1940), quoted in Newport v.
Newport, 219 Va. 48, 55, 245 S.E.2d 134, 139 (1978). For an excellent comparison of alimony
and support, see Holt, supra note 128, at 139-56.
166. Eaton v. Davis, 176 Va. 330, 338, 10 S.E.2d 893, 897. See generally Clark, supra note
12, at 14.1-14.12. For discussion of forfeiture of alimony due to fault, see notes 170-76 infra
and accompanying text.
167. Holt, supra note 128, at 140. See, e.g., White v. White, 181 Va. 162, 168, 24 S.E.2d
448, 451 (1943) (alimony is a "substantive right"); Branch v. Branch, 144 Va. 244, 251, 132
S.E. 303, 305 (1926) (alimony is a moral as well as legal obligation of the husband).
168. Brooker v. Brooker, 218 Va. 12, 235 S.E.2d 309 (1977) (neither party in divorce has
an automatic obligation to support the other); accord, Bristow v. Bristow, - Va. ._, 267
S.E.2d 89 (1980).
169. The General Assembly revised title 20 (domestic relations) in 1975 so as to abolish
the terms "alimony" and "husband" from the Code and to replace them with the terms
"support and maintenance" and "spouse." 1975 Va. Acts ch. 644 (codified at scattered sec-
tions of VA. COon ANN. § 20 (RepL Vol. 1975 and Cum. Supp. 1980)). Therefore, neither
party has an automatic right to support and maintenance. See, e.g., Bristow v. Bristow, -
Va. . 267 S.E.2d 89 (1980). For a discussion of these legislative amendments, see Holt,
supra note 128, at 140-56; 1974-1975 Virginia Survey, supra note 114, at 1742-51.
170. Carneal v. Carneal, 211 Va. 162, 176 S.E.2d 305 (1970) (wife deserted family home
without justification and was not entitled to alimony). See also Mason v. Mason, 209 Va.
528, 165 S.E.2d 392 (1969); McClung v. McClung, 206 Va. 782, 146 S.E.2d 195 (1966); Stolfi
v. Stolfi, 203 Va. 696, 126 S.E.2d 923 (1962); Robinette v. Robinette, 153 Va. 342, 149 S.E.
493 (1929); Duff v. Duff, 145 Va. 526, 134 SM. 555 (1926); House v. House, 102 Va. 235, 46
S.E. 299 (1904); Harris v. Harris, 72 Va. (31 Gratt) 13 (1878).
171. Freed & Foster, supra note 122, at 115. There is a modem trend to minimize the
importance of the role of fault in awarding alimony. Sixteen jurisdictions, including the Vir-
gin Islands, expressly or impliedly exclude marital fault from consideration; 12 states regard
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should be noted that this rule was codified and extended to either spouse
as the result of amendments to code section 20-107.172
The court consistently held throughout the 1970's that when a divorce
is granted under code section 20-91(9),17s the husband is not relieved of
the obligation to support his wife unless it can be shown that the separa-
tion was caused by the wife's fault or misconduct. 7 ' The fault or miscon-
duct which would deprive a wife of alimony when a "no fault" decree is
awarded the husband must be such as to constitute grounds for divorce
under the fault provisions of code section 20-91.170 Therefore, in Lancas-
ter v. Lancaster,17 6 the court held that it was reversible error for a chan-
cellor to deny a wife support and maintenance in the absence of finding
fault or misconduct on her part.
In Brooker v. Brooker,277 the court additionally held that it was revers-
ible error for the trial court to deny support and maintenance to a spouse
without making any findings regarding the various factors which code sec-
tion 20-107 requires a court to consider in determining such support and
maintenance.1 78 Even though these standards were not effective until
marital fault as a discretionary factor;, 15 states have statutes which make no mention of
marital fault; seven jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, consider economic mis-
conduct a factor. Id. at 115-16. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 308(b) has com-
pletely abolished any consideration of fault or marital misconduct in determining the
amount of support to be given. For a discussion of the role of fault in other states, see 87
HARv. L. Rav. 1579 (1974).
172. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides "that no permanent support
and maintenance or lump sum payment for the spouse shall be awarded from a spouse if
there exists in his or her favor a ground of divorce under any provision of §§ 20-91(1)
through (8) or 20-95."
173. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (RepL Vol. 1975) provides, in pertinent part, that either
spouse may obtain a divorce after living separate and apart for one year. For a discussion of
non-fault divorces, see notes 42-52 supra and accompanying text.
174. Guy v. Guy, 210 Va. 536, 172 S.E.2d 735 (1970) (emphasis added) (citing Mason v.
Mason, 209 Va. 528, 165 S.E.2d 392 (1969)). See also Bristow v. Bristow, - Vs. _, 267
S.E.2d 89 (1980); Monahan v. Monahan, 212 Va. 406, 184 S.E.2d 812 (1971).
175. Young v. Young, 2i2 Va. 761, 762, 188 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1972) (emphasis added). See
also Brooker v. Brooker, 218 Va. 12, 235 S.E.2d 309 (1977); Rowland v. Rowland, 215 Va.
344, 210 S.E.2d 149 (1974); Graham v. Graham, 210 Va. 608, 172 S.E.2d 724 (1970).
176. 212 Va. 127, 183 S.E.2d 158 (1971).
177. 218 Va. 12, 235 S.E.2d 309 (1977). The court inferred, in dictum, that neither party
to a divorce had an automatic obligation to support the other. "The 1975 amendment to
Code § 20-91, Acts 1975, c. 644, places husband and wife on an equal footing in that either
spouse now may be awarded support and maintenance from the other." Id. at 13 n.2, 235
S.E.2d at 310 n.2.
178. Id. at 13, 235 S.E.2d at 310. VA. COD ANN. § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides
that:
The court shall, in determining such support and maintenance for the spouse or chil-
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1975, they are basically the same tests traditionally applied in determin-
ing alimony and child support.'79 Thus, where the wife establishes her
need for support and the husband's ability to provide it, and she is not
shown to be guilty of misconduct entitling the husband to divorce, the
chancellor has no choice but to award the wife support and
maintenance.8 0
In resolving the question of "how much support and maintenance" is
required, the applicable rule requires a husband, within the limits of his
financial ability, to maintain his former wife in the manner in which she
was accustomed during the marriage.18' Virginia courts are empowered to
assess spousal support awards, not to penalize or reward either spouse,
but rather to do equity between the parties' interests and to protect soci-
ety's interests in the incidents of the marital relationship.8 2 It is neces-
sary to balance the several needs and capacities of the husband and wife,
and the balance must be struck and awards made "upon the basis of the
circumstances disclosed by the evidence at the time of the award. '18 3
dren, consider the following.
(1) The earning capacity, obligation and needs, and financial resources of the parties;
(2) The education and training of the parties and the ability and opportunity of the
parties to secure such education and training;
(3) The standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) The duration of the marriage;
(5) The age, physical and mental condition of the parties;
(5a) The contributions, monetary and non-monetary, of each party to the well-being
of the family,
(5b) The property interests of the parties, both real and personal;
(6) Such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.
179. See, e.g., Ingram v. Ingram, 217 Va. 27, 225 S.E.2d 362 (1976). See also Holt, supra
note 128, at 144-52.
180. Thomas v. Thomas, 217 Va. 502, 229 S.E.2d 887 (1976). The trial court awarded the
wife a divorce but only awarded periodic payments of $200.00 per month for her support
and maintenance for two years. The parties were married 30 years and the wife's only em-
ployment outside of raising four children and housekeeping was as a substitute teacher. The
wife was not qualified for any employment other than substitute teaching and her yearly
earnings did not exceed $1,546.00; her needs were $757.57 per month. On the other hand,
Mr. Thomas earned $28,000.00 per year and had a take-home salary of $1,546.56 per month;
his needs were $1,573.08. Since the record was devoid of any evidence that Mrs. Thomas'
need or Mr. Thomas' ability to provide for her need would substantially change within the
immediate or reasonably foreseeable future, the Virginia Supreme Court also held that the
trial court's action in limiting its award to two years was reversible error as it was not sup-
ported by the record. Id. at 503-05, 229 S.E.2d at 888-90.
181. Butler v. Butler, 217 Va. 195, 227 S.E.2d 688 (1976); Robertson v. Robertson, 215 Va.
425, 211 S.E.2d 41 (1975); Turner v. Turner, 213 Va. 42, 189 S.E.2d 361 (1972).
182. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 219 Va. 993, 254 S.E.2d 56 (1979).
183. Id. at 995, 254 S.E.2d at 58 (quoting Thomas v. Thomas, 217 Va. 502, 505, 229
S.E.2d 887, 889-90 (1976)).
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In "striking the balance," the Virginia Supreme Court held in Brauer v.
Brauer,184 that it was improper in a divorce suit to construe the will of a
divorced husband's mother who left her son a life estate in realty assessed
at over $200,000.00. However, the court held that it was proper, in deter-
mining the husband's ability to pay alimony, to consider his ability to
derive income from his life estate.285 The Brauer holding was affirmed in
Robertson v. Robertson,'"s where the court held it was improper to con-
sider the possibility of a greater return on the husband's investments
since there was no indication that the husband had designed the invest-
ment plan to frustrate his wife's efforts to secure alimony."5 7
While considering both actual earnings and the capacity to earn, the
Virginia Supreme Court will not permit a husband to choose to remain in
a lower salaried, career-oriented, staff position which sacrifices immediate
income for future expectations to penalize his wife and children.'" How-
ever, the court has also held that there can be no award of alimony where
the wife can presently support herself, and that a wife with the ability to
work must do so. 1s 9
184. 215 Va. 62, 205 S.E.2d 665 (1974).
185. Id. at 65, 205 S.E.2d at 667. The husband's mother died testate in 1958 seized of real
property assessed in 1974 at $207,600.00. The mother devised all of her property to her son
"for life and at his death the residue of said property, if any, to be divided equally between
[her] .. . brother and sisters, as might be living." Id. She also appointed an executor and
authorized him to use such portions of the estate as might be necessary, in addition to the
income, for the maintenance and support of her son. After awarding the wife judgment
against her husband for arrearages in alimony of $23,353.00 the trial court denied the hus-
band's motion for a reduction of alimony. The trial court also noted the value of the hus-
band's life estate and ordered the husband's alimony be increased to $500.00 per month.
The husband appealed the judgment against him and claimed the amount fixed by the trial
court was excessive. On appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the wife's judgment
for alimony arrearages was a lien on her husband's real property including his life estate.
However, the alimony award was reversed and remanded; the trial court was instructed to
consider not only the needs of both parties, but also the ability of the husband to pay,
taking into consideration the existence of the judgment lien on his life estate. Id. at 64-68,
205 S.E.2d at 667-69.
186. 215 Va. 425, 211 S.E.2d 41 (1975).
187. Id. at 428, 211 S.E.2d at 44 (likewise, it was not proper to consider what the husband
might ultimately receive as a potential recipient of a share of a trust fund).
188. Butler v. Butler, 217 Va. 195, 227 S.E.2d 688 (1976). See also Hawkins v. Hawkins,
187 Va. 595, 47 S.E.2d 436 (1948).
189. Brauer v. Brauer, 215 Va. 62, 66-67, 205 S.E.2d 665, 668 (1978) (in dictum, citing
Babcock v. Babcock, 172 Va. 219, 1 S.E.2d 328 (1939); Gagliano v. Gagliano, 215 Va. 447,
451-52, 211 S.E.2d 62, 65 (1975) (denial of alimony not plainly wrong in view of the wife's
present income and ability to earn as well as award of attorney's fees and child support);
Barnard v. Barnard, 132 Va. 155, 111 S.E. 227 (1927). See also Baytop v. Baytop, 199 Va.
388, 395, 100 S.E.2d 14, 19 (1957) (court refused to award wife alimony since she had always
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Practitioners should take note of the recent case of Bristow v. Bris-
tow1"0 where the Virginia Supreme Court made it clear that it is revers-
ible error for a trial court to rely upon only one factor of code section 20-
107 in awarding spousal support. The chancellor in Bristow, after finding
that neither party was entitled to a divorce based on marital fault, en-
tered a "no-fault" divorce decree and denied the wife support and main-
tenance. His decision to deny support was based solely on code section20-107(4).29]L
Upon appeal, the court first noted that the husband had not proven a
ground of divorce against his wife and thus was not relieved of any obli-
gation he might otherwise have to support his wife.0 2 Next, the court
stated that neither party has an automatic obligation to support the
other.29 3 Rejecting the husband's constitutional arguments against sexual
discrimination, the court held that the chancellor was mandated by the
language of code section 20-107 to consider the specific factors contained
therein. It was, therefore, reversible error for the chancellor to fail to con-
sider all the factors and to rely upon the fourth factor alone.'"
Although this holding on first blush may appear to signal a reactionary
return to the concept of alimony as a substantive right, such an assess-
ment would be incorrect in two respects. First, the Virginia Supreme
Court was concerned with the equity of permanently denying support and
maintenance when it stated:
We do not think the error [of the chancellor in only considering one factor]
was harmless. The holding based upon it not only denied the wife the pres-
ent right to support but also foreclosed forever the right she would other-
wise enjoy under Code § 20-109 to petition for support some time in the
earned enough money on her own to amply support herself).
190. - Va. , 267 S.E.2d 89 (1980).
191. Id. at , 267 S.E.2d 89, 90. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107(4) (Cum. Supp. 1980) provides
that the court shall consider the duration of the marriage. The chancellor held that the
husband was not liable to support "this lady because they were just married such a very
short period of time [11 months]." In referring to the other factors in § 20-107, he stated, "I
really don't get to those grounds." Id. at , 267 S.E.2d at 90. See note 76 supra and ac-
companying text for discussion of § 20-107.
192. Id. at ., 267 S.E.2d at 90 (quoting § 20-91(9)). See notes 170-76 supra and accom-
panying text for discussion of non-fault divorce and alimony.
193. Id. at ---, 267 S.E.2d at 90 (quoting Brooker v. Brooker, 218 Va. 12, 13 n.2, 235
S.E.2d 309, 310 n.2 (1977).
194. The husband contended that the chancellor had the discretion, under § 20-107, to
consider only the duration of the marriage. - Va. at _ 267 S.E.2d at 90. The court did
not address the husband's argument regarding constitutional guarantees against sex
discrimination.
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future "as the circumstances may make proper."19 5
Second, and perhaps most important, the holding emphasizes that trial
courts cannot pick and choose among the various factors set out in code
section 20-107. Trial courts are required to make an objective, non-biased
decision, taking into account the various personal factors of both spouses,
whether either party may receive support and the amount thereof.
Although Virginia trial courts are prevented from equitably dividing
personalty upon divorce by the holding in Guy,198 the Virginia Supreme
Court, in Turner v. Turner,1 affirmed a lump sum award of $6,000.00 to
the wife for the express purpose of furnishing and equipping her new resi-
dence. The court made no effort to distinguish Guy and noted that ali-
mony ordinarily takes the form of either a lump sum payment or the
more usual periodic payments.1 98 However, the court held that where spe-
cial equities exist or where there is an impelling reason for its necessity or
desirability, trial courts may award a lump sum in addition to the peri-
odic payments of alimony and support. The lump sum award of $6,000.00
was affirmed by the court because it found that the evidence fully estab-
lished impelling necessity.' The court reaffirmed and extended the Tur-
ner decision in Robertson v. Robertson,200 where it affirmed the trial
court's decree that the husband must provide the wife with "suitable"
replacements for any furniture or furnishings he might remove from the
family apartment where the wife continued to reside.2 01
195. - Va. at -, 267 S.E.2d at 90 (quoting Losyk v. Losyk, 212 Va. 220, 223, 183 S.E.2d
135, 137 (1971)).
196. See notes 122-132 supra and accompanying text for discussion of the Guy decision.
197. 213 Va. 42, 189 S.E.2d 361 (1972).
198. Id. at 44, 189 S.E.2d-at 363.
199. 213 Va. at 44, 189 S.E.2d at 363. In Turner, the court stressed that the wife had been
deprived of occupancy of the marital residence and its furnishings by the husband who
changed the locks and took possession of the house and its contents while the wife was
temporarily absent. The wife owned no furnishings or equipment and had no means of ac-
quiring them. On the other hand, the husband's annual income prior to their separation was
in excess of $50,000.00, with a net worth in excess of one million dollars. Id. at 43, 189
S.E.2d at 363.
200. 215 Va. 425, 211 S.E.2d 41 (1975).
201. The court denied that the provision was violative of the rule enunciated in Guy, and
held that it was consonant with Turner. Id. at 430, 211 S.E.2d at 45. The General Assembly
codified the lump sum concept of Turner and Robertson in 1977. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107
(Cum. Supp. 1980) provides that the court may, in its discretion, award a lump sum pay-
ment "in addition to or in lieu of periodic payments for maintenance and support of a
spouse." For a critical analysis of the Turner and Robertson exception to the Guy rule, see
Separation and Divorce, supra note 63, at 115-17. See also Domestic Relations, 1972-1973
Virginia Survey, 59 VA. L. Rav. 1520, 1521 (1973).
DOMESTIC RELATIONS NOTE
With respect to awarding spousal and child support, code section 107
vests discretion in the chancellor, and such awards will not be reduced or
set aside on appeal absent proof from the record that the amounts are, as
a matter of law, "obviously excessive" or unsupported by the evidence. 02
Likewise, section 20-103 provides that the trial court may make orders, in
its discretion, for the support and maintenance of a petitioning spouse in
a suit for divorce (alimony pendente lite).203 Where the wife has no sepa-
rate estate and is the defendant in a divorce action, it is proper for the
trial court to allow a reasonable sum to be paid by her husband for attor-
ney's fees and suit money. However, the court should not entirely ignore
the financial condition of the husband in allowing the wife a reasonable
sum for attorney's fees and suit money.2 °4
As in spousal and child support, the awarding of attorney's fees upon a
final divorce decree is a matter within the discretion of the chancellor.0 5
However, in Robertson v. Robertson,206 the record did not justify or ex-
plain an award of $10,000.00 in counsel fees to the wife. The Virginia
202. Ingram v. Ingram, 217 Va. 27, 29, 225 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1976) (amounts awarded for
alimony and child support, $800.00 and $400.00 per month respectively, were not obviously
excessive and were not unsupported by evidence that the husband had a net worth of
$1,029,313.70 and an annual income estimated at $100,000.00). See also Turner v. Turner,
213 Va. 42, 43, 189 S.E.2d 361, 363 (1972) (award of $800 per month alimony and $400 per
month child support found to be fair and reasonable). Accord, Thomas v. Thomas, 217 Va.
502, 229 S.E.2d 887 (1976); Gagliano v. Gagliano, 215 Va. 447, 211 S.E.2d 62 (1975); Treger
v. Treger, 212 Va. 538, 186 S.E.2d 82 (1972).
203. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-103 (1975 Repl Vol. & Cum. Supp. 1980). See also, VA CODE
ANN. §§ 20-71 and 71.1 (Repl. Vol 1975) (temporary orders for support and attorney's fees
for such). See Moon v. Moon, 210 Va. 575, 577, 172 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1970) where the wife
was awarded $125.00 per month separate maintenance after her husband's desertion. The
wife was granted a divorce from the husband on the ground of desertion, but the court
vacated the separate maintenance decree and awarded her alimony of $25.00 per month. On
appeal, the Virginia Supreme Court found the nominal award of alimony unrealistic and
unsupported by the evidence that the wife was employed and had an income independent of
the husband's contributions. The court reversed and remanded the alimony award and held
that she should not be penalized for her industry in working at two jobs, nor for her frugal-
ity in establishing a savings account as a shield against emergencies. Section 20-107 and the
Bristow holding would now require the trial court, at a minimum to consider the wife's
earnings and earning capacity. See notes 190-95 supra and accompanying text.
204. Rowlee v. Rowlee, 211 Va. 689, 179 S.E.2d 461 (1971). See also Wilkerson v. Wilker-
son, 214 Va. 395, 200 S.E.2d 581 (1973); Eddens v. Eddens, 188 Va. 511, 50 S.E.2d 397
(1948) (obligor may be punished by trial court for contempt if he refuses to comply with an
order for alimony pendente lite, the payment of attorney's fees and/or suit money); Mc-
Farland v. McFarland, 179 Va. 418, 19 S.E.2d 77 (1942).
205. Ingram v. Ingram, 217 Va. 27, 225 S.E.2d 362 (1976); Jones v. Jones, 216 Va. 161,
162, 217 S.E.2d 800, 801 (1975); Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 214 Va. 395, 398, 200 S.E.2d 581,
584 (1973).
206. 215 Va. 425, 211 S.E.2d 41 (1975).
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Supreme Court refused to sustain the award and instructed the trial
court to re-examine the amount of counsel fees based upon a proper
showing of what was reasonable210
In Lawrence v. Lawrence,20s the court also held that the time at which
permanent alimony shall commence is within the sound discretion of the
court. Therefore, it is proper for the chancellor to ante-date a final ali-
mony (support and maintenance) award to the time of the commence-
ment of the divorce suit.2 9 If there are no restrictions on support and
maintenance payments, the recipient is free to use the funds as he or she
sees fit. In Jenkins v. Jenkins,21 0 the court held that the wife was not
required to use her alimony payments to pay the mortgage installments
or real estate taxes since no part of the alimony was designated for any
particular purpose.21
"Code section 20-109 grants the courts of Virginia continuing juris-
diction to modify awards where changed circumstances are demon-
strated." '212 It is the obligation of the divorced husband to pay the speci-
fied amounts according to the terms of the alimony award and he cannot
vary the terms to suit his convenience. If conditions change, the hus-
band's remedy, if any, is obtained by applying to the court for relief avail-
able pursuant to code section 20-109.21s
207. Id. at 429-30, 211 S.E.2d at 43. Cf. Thomas v. Thomas, 217 Va. 502, 229 S.E.2d 887
(1976) (failure to award counsel fees is an abuse of discretion when trial court finds wife
needs and is entitled to support and maintenance and the husband has the financial ability
to meet needs). See generally CLARK, supra note 12, at § 14.2, at 428-31. In most states,
attorney fees may be awarded to a spouse even though she was the losing party in the
divorce action. Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 1227 (1970).
208. 212 Va. 44, 181 S.E.2d 640 (1971).
209. Id. at 47, 181 S.E.2d at 642. This issue had previously been undecided in Virginia.
The court adopted the rule that had been followed in other jurisdictions and noted that
Cralle v. Cralle, 84 Va. 198, 6 S.E. 12 (1887) was not dispositive of the issue. 212 Va. at 46,
181 S.E.2d at 642. See Switzer v. Elmer, 175 La. 724, 144 So. 432 (1932); Winkel v. Winkel,
178 Md. 489, 15 A.2d 914, 917 (1940). See also 2 NELsON, Divorce and Annulment, § 14.62,
at 91 (2d rev. ed. 1961).
210. 211 Va. 797, 180 S.E.2d 516 (1971).
211. Id. at 799, 180 S.E.2d at 518. The Jenkins court also held that, upon sale of property
of which parties were tenants in common, the husband should be required to reimburse his
wife for one-half of the sum paid by her on the mortgage and that she should be charged
only with one-half rather than all of the real estate taxes. 211 Va. at 800, 180 S.E.2d at 518.
212. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 219 Va. 993, 995, 254 S.E.2d 56, 58 (1979) (quoting Thomas v.
Thomas, 217 Va. 502, 505, 229 S.E.2d 887, 889-90 (1976)). VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109 (RepL
Vol. 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980) provides that "upon petition of either party the court may
increase, decrease or cause to cease, any support and maintenance for the spouse ... as the
circumstances may make proper."
213. Richardson v. Moore, 217 Va. 422, 424, 229 S.E.2d 864, 866 (1976) (quoting Newton
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The Virginia Supreme Court has interpeted this provision to mean that
a trial court can alter a previous award of support only if such an award
was actually made or a power to make a later award was expressly re-
served by the trial court in the divorce decree.214 However, in Gagliano v.
Gaglian 215 the court instructed the trial court to incorporate into the
final decree a reservation of power to reinstate the cause and award the
wife alimony upon a proper showing of a change of circumstances. 216
Although trial courts are vested with jurisdiction to modify awards,
trial courts do not have authority to enter a divorce decree that includes
an escalator clause for spousal support. In Jacobs v. Jacobs,217 the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court interpreted the statutory scheme for support to dic-
tate that support awards must be determined in light of contemporary
circumstances and then, if necessary, redetermined in light of new cir-
cumstances. Since the escalator clause was premised upon the occurrence
of uncertain future circumstances, the court held that the award ignored
the design and defeated the purpose of the statutory scheme.218
v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 519, 118 S.E.2d 656, 659 (1961)). See also Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va.
834, 140 S.E.2d 663 (1965). In Richardson, the Virginia Supreme Court also held that a
former wife's passive acquiescence did not excuse her husband's noncompliance, who with-
out seeking a court order reduced payments from $75.00 to $60.00 per month. Though the
husband's administrator contended that the wife was barred from recovering the support
arrearages by laches, the court stated that "even a court of equity, in an effort to do equity,
cannot disregard the provisions of a lawful decree." 217 Va. at 423-24, 229 S.E.2d at 865-66
(quoting Fearon v. Fearon, 207 Va. 927, 931, 154 S.E.2d 165, 168 (1967)). But see Gagliano
v. Gagliano, 215 Va. 447, 450-51, 211 S.E.2d 62, 64-65 (1975) where the Supreme Court of
Virginia estopped the wife from denying that payments made by her husband were not
proper credit against payment fixed in the divorce decree. The court emphasized that the
wife received the payments and disbursed the funds at her exclusive discretion and that
when the basic purposes of a support decree are not frustrated, a court may permit techni-
cal deviation from a divorce decree to avoid inequity.
214. Holt, supra note 128, at 143; see Losyk v. Losyk, 212 Va. 220, 222, 183 S.E.2d 135,
137 (1971), where the language "with leave to either party to have the same reinstated for
good cause shown" was an insufficient "express reservation" to allow the trial court to make
a subsequent award of alimony under § 20-109. See also Liverman v. Liverman, 463 F.
Supp. 906 (E.D. Va. 1978) (certain joint debts created by husband and wife pursuant to a
valid agreement for the payment of alimony were not dischargeable in bankruptcy).
215. 215 Va. 447, 211 S.E.2d 62 (1975).
216. This result appears to be equitable because the trial court had declined to award the
wife support and maintenance based on her present ability to support herself. Id. at 448,
211 S.E.2d at 63. Also, the trial court found as a fact that the wife was without fault. Id. at
452, 211 S.E.2d at 66.
217. 219 Va. 993, 254 S.E.2d 56 (1979). The escalator clause required the husband to pay
his wife 25% of all income received by him in any calendar year in excess of $32,000.00.
218. Id. at 995-96, 254 S.E.2d at 58 (citing Robertson v. Robertson, 215 Va. 425, 428, 211
S.E.2d 41, 44 (1975)) (improper to consider what husband mighf ultimately receive as po-
tential recipient of a share of a trust fund). See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-107, 109 (Cum. Supp.
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Finally, Virginia courts may apportion unitary awards made pursuant
to settlement agreements in divorce proceedings where the evidence indi-
cates a change of circumstances never contemplated by the parties when
they entered into their settlement agreement. In Carter v. Carter,19 the
Supreme Court of Virginia adopted this rule for the first time and held
that the unitary award was for both alimony and child support.220 There-
fore, the trial court was authorized, under code section 20-108, to alter
the child support portion of the unitary award when custody of the chil-
dren was transferred from the wife to the husband.221 Wickam v. Wick-
am,222 however, limited the Carter holding to cases involving substan-
tially similar factual situations. While distinguishing Carter, the court
held that it did not intend Carter to authorize the apportionment of uni-
tary awards made pursuant to approved settlement agreements without a
finding of necessity for apportioning the award.223
6. Child Custody
Perhaps the most significant changes in Virginia domestic relations law
during the decade between 1970 and 1980 occurred in the area of child
custody. Practitioners should take note that the Virginia General Assem-
bly adopted with slight change the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
1980).
219. 215 Va. 475, 211 S.E.2d 253 (1975). Divorced husband petitioned for permanent cus-
tody of children and for termination of monthly payments which he was required to make
pursuant to separation agreement. The wife appealed the reduction of the husband's
monthly payments from $600.00 to $150.00 after he was awarded custody.
220. Id. at 480-81, 211 S.E.2d at 258. The Carter holding is in keeping with the majority
of decisions. See, e.g., Green v. Green, 168 Colo. 303, 451 P.2d 283 (1969); Beasley v. Beas-
ley, 154 So. 2d 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Bebermeyer v. Bebermeyer, 241 Md. 72, 215
A.2d 463 (1965). Contra, Hale v. Hale, 6 Cal. App. 2d 661, 45 P.2d 246 (1935); Blalock v.
Blalock, 214 Ga. 586, 105 S.E.2d 721 (1958); Estes v. Estes, 192 Ga. 100, 14 S.E.2d 680
(1941). For compilation of cases, see Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 1110 (1961).
221. The court's holding prevented a windfall to the wife after the transfer of child cus-
tody. She contended that the holding in McLoughlin, interpreting § 20-109, prevented the
chancellor from entering any order to reduce payments intended to be entirely for her sup-
port pursuant to the parties' prior settlement agreement. The husband argued, on the other
hand, that the lump sum was entirely for child support and that the trial court had author-
ity to alter or amend such an order. 215 Va. at 480, 211 S.E.2d at 258. See notes 135-36
supra and accompanying text for discussion of McLoughlin. See notes 275-78 infra and
accompanying text for discussion of § 20-108.
222. 215 Va. 694, 213 S.E.2d 750 (1975).
223. Id. at 696, 213 S.E.2d at 751-52. The court noted that Carter had addressed an en-
tirely different problem. In Wickam, the wife petitioned for an increase in child support
(rather than the decrease requested by the husband in Carter) but she failed to show her
necessity (i.e., that circumstances had so changed as to warrant an increase in child sup-
port). Id. at 696, 213 S.E.2d at 752.
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Act effective January 1, 1980.24 The purpose of the Act is to discourage
continued controversies over child custody and thereby stabilize the home
environment for the contested child, to deter child abductions and like
practices, and to promote interstate assistance in adjudicating custody
matters.223 As of 1979, thirty-seven states had adopted the Act, and it is
anticipated that the cooperative efforts of these states will help put an
end to forum shopping and continuing litigation in child custody
disputes. 228
In deciding the difficult question of custody with respect to minor chil-
dren whose parents are divorced or separated, code section 31-15 dictates
that the welfare of the child is the primary, paramount and controlling
consideration. All other matters are secondary. 2 7 Code section 31-15 also
negates the judicial device of a legal presumption in favor of either par-
ent.228 Notwithstanding this statutory mandate, the Virginia Supreme
Court adopted the "tender years" doctrine 229 in the landmark decision of
Mullen v. Mullen.23 0 This case resulted in a maternal preference rule,
and, as traditionally applied in Virginia, "courts religiously relied upon
the tender years rationale in awarding custody to the mother. '23 1
224. 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 229 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-125 to -146 (Cum. Supp.
1980)).
225. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AcT, 9 Uniform Laws Ann. § 1. For an excel-
lent analysis of the Act and its effect on Virginia law, see Comment, The Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act in Virginia, 14 U. RICH. L. REv. 435 (1980).
226. Comment, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in Virginia, supra note 225,
at 435-36.
227. Hall v. Hall, 210 Va. 668, 671, 173 S.E.2d 865, 868 (1970). See also Harper v. Harper,
217 Va. 477, 229 S.E.2d 875 (1976); Burnside v. Burnside, 216 Va. 691, 222 S.E.2d 529
(1976). VA. CODE ANN. § 31-15 (Repl. Vol. 1979) provides that "the court or judge of any
court of competent jurisdiction, in awarding the custody of the child to either parent or to
some other person, shall give primary consideration to the welfare of the child."
228. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-15 (Repl. Vol. 1979) provides, in pertinent part, that "as be-
tween the parents there shall be no presumption of law in favor of either."
229. The doctrine is a corollary of the overall maternal preference rule in resolving cus-
tody disputes between natural parents. Numerous courts have held that a mother's love is
so important to a child that the child should be given to the mother in preference to the
father, even though the latter may have been without fault and may have been awarded the
divorce. Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 262, 267-68 (1976). See Monahan v. Monahan, 212 Va. 406, 184
S.E.2d 812 (1971); Moore v. Moore, 212 Va. 153, 183 S.E.2d 172 (1971); Rowlee v. Rowlee,
211 Va. 689, 179 S.E.2d 461 (1971); Campbell v. Campbell, 203 Va. 61, 122 S.E.2d 658
(1961); Brooks v. Brooks, 200 Va. 530, 106 S.E.2d 611 (1959); Mullen v. Mullen, 188 Va. 259,
49 S.E.2d 349 (1948); Markley v. Markley, 145 Va. 596, 134 S.E. 536 (1926). For a detailed
analysis of the evolution of the doctrine in Virginia as well as nationwide trends, see Com-
ment, The "Tender Years" Doctrine in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 593 (1978).
230. 188 Va. 259, 49 S.E.2d 349 (1948).
231. Comment, The "Tender Years" Doctrine in Virginia, supra note 229, at 595.
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The Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed the traditional application of
the doctrine in Moore v. Moore,232 a custody dispute involving two daugh-
ters, ages eleven and seven. Although the husband was awarded the di-
vorce and was found to be a fit parent, the court held that the chancellor
should have awarded custody of the two children to the wife because
there was no evidence that she had neglected the children or that she was
unfit to have their custody.23 The court cited the "tender years" doctrine
in support of this holding, and stated that it was "settled practice" in
Virginia to award custody of children of tender years, especially girls, to
the mother if, "other things being equal," she was a fit and proper par-
ent.23 4 As noted by one commentator, the inference from Moore was that
the "mother would have to be adjudged 'unfit' by clear and convincing
evidence to preclude the application of the maternal preference."'3
Several recent decisions by the Virginia Supreme Court indicate that
the court has followed the trend of a number of other jurisdictions by
relegating the doctrine to a tie-breaker role to be used where all factors
are equal between the parents.236 The traditional view enunciated in
Moore was qualified in White v. White,3 7 when the court affirmed a cus-
tody award to the father of a child of "tender years," six year old son,
without finding that the mother was unfit.3 8 Although the facts of the
232. 212 Va. 153, 183 S.E.2d 172 (1971).
233. Id. at 155-56, 183 S.E.2d at 174-75. The wife deserted the husband because she in-
tended to marry an excommunicated minister with whom she had worked. She took custody
of her two girls, 11 and 7 years old, and resided at her mother's home. Although the court
found her relationship "improper," it did not conclude that she was not a good mother or
that the children would be subjected to immoral influence if she should marry. Id. at 155-56,
183 S.E.2d at 173-74.
234. Id. at 155, 183 S.E.2d at 174. See also Rowlee v. Rowlee, 211 Va. 689, 179 S.E.2d 461
(1971) (cited the "tender years" doctrine but rejected its applicability upon finding that the
mother was unfit); Monahan v. Monahan, 212 Va. 406, 184 S.E.2d 812 (1971) (held it was
error to find mother was not a proper person to have custody of her three daughters where
there was no evidence which would cast doubt upon her fitness).
235. Comment, The "Tender Years" Doctrine in Virginia, supra note 229, at 597.
236. Freed & Foster, supra note 123, at 123-24. As of 1978, twenty-seven jurisdictions,
including the District of Columbia, had rejected the doctrine by statute or court decision; 12
states had subordinated the doctrine to the best interests of the child; and 10 states, Vir-
ginia included, were applying the doctrine when all factors were equal between parents. Id.
at 124-25. See McCreery v. McCreery, 218 Va. 352, 237 S.E.2d 167 (1977); Brown v. Brown,
218 Va. 196, 237 S.E.2d 89 (1977); Clark v. Clark, 217 Va. 924, 234 S.E.2d 266 (1977);
Harper v. Harper, 217 Va. 477, 229 S.E.2d 875 (1976); Burnside v. Burnside, 216 Va. 691,
222 S.E.2d 529 (1976); White v. White, 215 Va. 765, 213 S.E.2d 766 (1975); Hall v. Hall, 210
Va. 668, 173 S.E.2d 865 (1970).
237. 215 Va. 765, 213 S.E.2d 766 (1975).
238. For a thorough discussion of White, see 1974-1975 Virginia Survey, supra note 114,
at 1739-40. See also Comment, The "Tender Years" Doctrine in Virginia, supra note 229,
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case "seemed to demand" application of the traditional "tender years"
doctrine, 39 the Supreme Court of Virginia broke new ground by empha-
sizing the qualifying phrase "if other things are equal. 2 40 After a rigorous
examination of the facts, the court held that the mother's home was less
suitable than the father's home and, therefore, it affirmed the custody
award to the father.241
It should be noted that the Virginia Supreme Court did not reject the
traditional application of the "tender years" doctrine in White; rather,
the court found that the maternal presumption was inoperative because"other things" were unequal between the mother and the father. "Still, it
clearly rejected a talismanic legal rule in favor of a more careful calculus
which could achieve the most beneficial disposition of the child's inter-
ests.124 2 This new approach was reaffirmed in Burnside v. Burnside,243
when the court utilized the White rationale to award custody of a seven
year old boy to his father.2 44 Significantly, the court also stated in dictum
that the "tender years" doctrine "is a flexible one and it is not to be ap-
plied without regard to the surrounding circumstances."2 "
The court's modification of the traditional application of the "tender
years" doctrine was completed in Harper v. Harper24 6 where it directly
at 597.
239. 1974-1975 Virginia Survey, supra note 114, at 1739. Both parents were found to be
fit and properly equipped to care for the child. Both homes were also determined to be
physically suitable. 215 Va. at 767-68, 213 S.E.2d at 768.
240. 215 Va. at 767, 213 S.E.2d at 768. Prior to White, the phrase "if other things are
equal" had been a superfluous part of the doctrine. Comment, The "Tender Years" Doc-
trine in Virginia, supra note 229, at 597.
241. 215 Va. at 767-68, 213 S.E.2d at 768-69. Rather than merely comparing physical ac-
commodations or material advantages to determine parental suitability, the court consid-
ered as determinative the "warmth and stability of the home environment and the kind of
home life which the child [could] be expected to experience." Id. at 768, 213 S.E.2d at 768.
The court found the father's home more suitable because of the "companionship of children
in the neighborhood where the child [had] resided for nearly three years and the affection-
ate interest of [the father's] mother and sister-in-law and of the [mother's] parents and
relatives." Id. at 768, 213 S.E.2d 768-69. In dissent, Justice Carrico stated that the court
should adhere to the "tender years" presumption. He termed the majority's finding that the
mother's home was unsuitable "a slender reed." Id. at 768-69, 213 S.E.2d at 769.
242. 1974-1975 Virginia Survey, supra note 114, at 1740.
243. 216 Va. 691, 222 S.E.2d 529 (1976).
244. The court noted that the facts in White were "strikingly similar to the facts in the
instant case, and the reasoning of the court there could well be applied here." Id. at 692, 222
S.E.2d at 530. Justice Carrico again dissented as in White. Id. at 694, 222 S.E.2d 530-31.
245. Id. at 692, 222 S.E.2d at 530 (quoting Portewig v. Ryder, 208 Va. 791, 794, 160
S.E.2d 789, 792 (1968)).
246. 217 Va. 477, 229 S.E.2d 875 (1976).
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confronted the maternal preference of Moore and the statutory language
of code section 31-15.247 The court noted that the Moore rule was not a
rule of law and that code section 31-15 "expressly states that there shall
be no presumption of law in favor of either parent."24 The court then
reduced the significance of the doctrine from a legal presumption to a
rebuttable inference by holding that, "[a]t most the principle for which
Moore stands is no more than a permissible and rebuttable inference,
that when the mother is fit, and other things are equal, she, as the natural
custodian, should have custody of a child of tender years. '24 9
Nevertheless, the Burnside ruling did not abolish the "tender years"
presumption. The court affirmed the presumption's continued existence
in McCreery v. McCreery,250 but limited the scope of the doctrine. The
court held that the custodial care received by the child was paramount to
the custody rights of a parent and that the "tender years" presumption
only concerned the custodial care received by the child. Likewise, the in-
ference controls only when evidence shows that the mother is fit and all"other things" affecting the child's welfare are equal.25 1 Therefore, even
though the trial court misinterpreted Burnside, when it held that Burn-
247. Comment, The "Tender Years" Doctrine in Virginia, supra note 229, at 598.
248. Harper v. Harper, 217 Va. 477, 479, 229 S.E.2d 875, 877 (custody award of six year
old boy to his mother affirmed by the supreme court on the basis of the "tender years"
doctrine after determining that both parents were fit and proper to have custody).
249. Id.; accord, Clark v. Clark, 217 Va. 924, 234 S.E.2d 266 (1977) (custody awarded to
father since mother's home, evaluated on basis of warmth and stability, rather than material
advantages, was not as suitable as the father's). See also Comment, The "Tender Years"
Doctrine in Virginia, supra note 229, at 598; 1976-1977 Virginia Survey, supra note 138, at
1421-22.
250. 218 Va. 352, 354-55, 237 S.E.2d 167, 168 (1977). The chancellor awarded custody of
two minor children to father and held that "tender years" presumption was abolished by
Burnside. The chancellor also found that the best interests ofrthe children would be better
served by awarding them to the custodial care of the their father.
251. Id. at 355, 237 S.E.2d at 168. The court also explicitly defined the qualifying phrase
"other things."
These "other things" are things which affect the quality of the custodial care received
by the child. Quality is determined not only in terms of the training, talents, and
resources of the custodian but also in terms of the motivation of the custodian to
make proper provision for the physical needs of the child, its psychological and emo-
tional health, its intellectual and cultural growth, and its moral development. Al-
though fully qualified in other respects, a person may be too ill-suited by tempera-
ment or too preoccupied with personal pursuits to administer proper care to a child.
Comparing the quality of care offered by two parents, the courts are guided by histo-
ries of past performance and prospects for future performance. If the comparison re-
sults in equipoise, the inference that the right of the child is best served by awarding
the child the custodial care of the mother controls.
Id. at 355, 237 S.E.2d at 168-69.
[Vol. 15:321358
19811 DOMESTIC RELATIONS NOTE 359
side abolished the tender years presumption, the Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed the award of custody to the father because the trial court had
considered the proper criteria concerning the respective custodial quali-
ties of the parents and had determined that the "other things" were not
equal.2 52 Commentators have noted that there will be little opportunity to
apply the "tender years" presumption if courts continue to analyze realis-
tically the custodial qualities or "other things" of each parent because it
is improbable that parental qualities will balance.253
The supreme court's examination of each parent's custodial qualities in
Brown v. Brown25' indicates that the moral climate in which children are
to be raised is an important consideration in determining custody, and
that the mother's adultery reflects on her moral values.2 55 The court
noted that "[a]n illicit relationship to which minor children are exposed
cannot be condoned. Such a relationship must necessarily be given the
most careful consideration in a custody proceeding."2 56 The Virginia Su-
preme Court has also examined each parent's financial ability to provide
a suitable and stable home for children in determining custody. In Alls v.
Als,2 57 the trial court found no evidence of unfitness of either parent but
awarded custody of a minor child to the husband. The court dismissed
252. Id. at 359, 237 S.E.2d at 171. The chancellor found that the "environment for raising
the children" was more favorable with the father. He considered the father's more spacious
living quarters and its close proximity to a school, the family's church and the children's
babysitter, as balanced against the mother's preoccupation with the glamor of her work and
her relationship with her supervisor. The court rejected the mother's constitutional argu-
ment that the decree denied her equal protection of the laws by treating her differently
from the father on the basis of her employment since the evidence supported the chancel-
lor's conclusions. Id. at 355-59, 237 S.E.2d at 169-71.
253. Comment, The "Tender Years" Doctrine in Virginia, supra note 229, at 600-01;
Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 262, 269 (1976); 1977-1978 Virginia Survey, supra note 145, at 1443-44.
254. 218 Va. 196, 237 S.E.2d 89 (1977) (mother appealed custody award of her two sons to
the father and lower court's determination that she was unfit for custody because of an
adulterous relationship).
255. Id. at 199, 237 S.E.2d at 91.
256. Id. at 199-200, 237 S.E.2d at 91-92. See also Wadlington, Sexual Relations After
Separation or Divorce: The New Morality and the Old and New Divorce Laws, 63 VA. L.
REv. 249 (1977).
257. 216 Va. 13, 216 S.E.2d 16 (1975). The wife left her husband the day after she insti-
tuted a divorce suit for cruelty and constructive desertion. She took her son to the home of
relatives and later moved into an apartment. She left the child at the home of her relatives
due to her limited earnings. The husband provided no funds for her support and the sup-
port of the child between their separation and the date of the hearing (about five weeks
later). Although the chancellor found no evidence of unfitness of either parent, the child was
awarded to the father. The chancellor emphasized that the wife had failed to "establish a
home with the child and to demonstrate that she could provide a stable situation for the
child." Id. at 14-15, 216 S.E.2d at 17.
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the trial court's emphasis of the wife's failure to provide a stable situation
for the child and remanded the custody award to the father because there
was no evidence that the wife would not be able to provide a suitable and
stable home if she received support and maintenance from the hus-
band.25 The holding in Alls indicates that the court will not allow a
spouse to be penalized in a custody proceeding for the failure of the other
spouse to provide support and maintenance.
In a line of cases involving custody disputes between natural parents
and non-parents, the court balanced the best interests of the children
with the rights of the natural parents.259 In Dyer v. Howell,260 the natural
father of a child who had been formally divested of custody2s6 sought to
change custody of his daughter from the child's maternal aunt and uncle
to himself. The court declined to resolve an apparent conflict between the
rules set out in Judd v. Van Horn262 and Forbes v. Haney.2'6 In Dyer,
since the father had been formally divested of custody and the child had
been awarded to the maternal aunt and uncle, the burden was on the
father to show that circumstances had so changed that it would be in the
258. The court determined that the husband was not entitled to a divorce on the ground
of the wife's desertion. Id. at 15, 216 S.E.2d at 17. For a discussion of the court's holding on
this issue, see notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text. As a result of its holding, the court
remanded the case for a determination of the wife's support and maintenance under § 20-
107. "In view of the wife's entitlement to separate maintenance, and the effect it might have
upon her ability to provide a suitable home for the child," it was likewise necessary for the
trial court to reconsider the custody award to the father. 216 Va. at 15, 216 S.E.2d at 17. See
also Carpenter v. Carpenter, 220 Va. 299, 257 S.E.2d 845 (1979). The mother of two children
appealed a decree which denied her consent to remove the residence of her two minor chil-
dren from Virginia and permanently restrained and enjoined such change of residence with-
out prior court approval. The chancellor weighed various factors and determined that the
best interests of the children would not be served by such a move. Since the chancellor's
ruling was not clearly erroneous and was supported by the evidence, the court found no
abuse of discretion and affirmed the decree. Id. at 303, 257 S.E.2d at 847-48.
259. For discussion of parental rights in adoption proceedings, see notes 330-65 infra and
accompanying text.
260. 212 Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 789 (1971).
261. Id. at 454-55, 184 S.E.2d 790-91. The father killed his wife and was found not guilty
by reason of insanity. He subsequently was adjudged mentally competent after which he
remarried and became the father of a second child. His daughter was placed in temporary
custody after her mother's death and was later placed with the maternal aunt and uncle, the
Howells. She resided with the Howells thereafter.
262. 195 Va. 988, 81 S.E.2d 432 (1954) (natural parent is entitled to custody unless it is
proved that he is unfit, the law presuming that the best interests of the child will be served
by placing the child in the parent's custody).
263. 204 Va. 712, 133 S.E.2d 533 (1963) (welfare of the child is the paramount concern;
where such welfare would best be served by denying custody to the parent, the technical
rights of the latter may be disregarded).
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child's best interests to transfer custody to him. 264
The holding in Dyer was not dispositive in Wilkerson v. Wilkerson265
where the court held that the rights of parents cannot be lightly severed
but are to be respected if at all consonant with the best interest of the
child.26 Therefore, in the absence of a showing of unfitness of the parent
by the parties opposing the parent's right to custody, special facts and
circumstances must be shown constituting an extraordinary reason for
taking a child away from its parents. 2 7
7. Child Support Orders
As in the area of child custody, there has been substantial change in
the area of child support and maintenance as the result of legislative
changes and judicial interpretations. Traditionally, it was the father's le-
gal and moral duty to support his dependent infant children;26 his duty
was based upon his right to their custody and control.26 9 This traditional
rule regarding the father's duty of support was overruled in the recent
case of Featherstone v. Brooks.270 The supreme court held that both par-
ents of a child owe that child a duty of support during minority. This
decision is especially noteworthy since the father had custody of the three
264. 212 Va. at 456-57, 184 S.E.2d at 792-93. The trial court determined that the father
did not prove that transferring custody to him would be in his daughter's best interests. On
the contrary, his visits with the child made her anxious and tense, his remarriage had not
been tested, the Howell's marriage was settled, and their home was the only home the child
knew. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed this decision because it was not clearly errone-
ous and was supported by the evidence. Id. Accord, McEntire v. Redfearn, 217 Va. 313, 227
S.E.2d 741 (1976) (in custody dispute between natural parent and maternal grandmother,
burden upon father to prove that circumstances had changed since earlier juvenile court
determination that custody should be assumed by the court to the exclusion of the father);
Watson v. Shepard, 217 Va. 538, 229 S.E.2d 897 (1976) (denial of mother's petition to regain
custody was based on her voluntary relinquishment of custody, and burden was on mother
to show that circumstances had so changed that it would be in child's best interests to
transfer custody).
265. 214 Va. 395, 200 S.E.2d 581 (1973) (husband awarded divorce; temporary custody
order entered with his approval awarding custody of child to wife's step-aunt during pen-
dency of divorce action).
266. Id. at 396-97, 200 S.E.2d at 583 (citing Malpass v. Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 400, 192
S.E.2d 794, 799 (1972)).
267. 214 Va. at 398, 200 S.E.2d at 583. The court noted that the correct rule of law was
that laid down in Judd, and the wife's burden, therefore, was to show her husband's unfit-
ness by clear and convincing evidence. See also Higgins v. Higgins, 205 Va. 324, 329-30, 136
S.E.2d 793, 797 (1964).
268. Boaze v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 786, 183 S.E. 263 (1936).
269. Butler v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 609, 110 S.E. 868 (1922).
270. 220 Va. 443, 258 S.E.2d 513 (1979).
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children and had been providing for their support.271 In another recent
decision, Cutshaw v. Cutshaw,27 2 the court held that parents have the le-
gal obligation to support their children only during their children's mi-
nority although parents can contract to support the children after their
minority.2 73 Thus, it was reversible error for a trial court to determine
that a father's obligation continued after the child's eighteenth birthday
because the court's jurisdiction to provide for the child's support and
maintenance terminated when the child attained its majority."
Code section 20-108271 expressly gives a court continuing jurisdiction to
change or modify its decree as to the care, custody and maintenance of
minor children if a material change in condition and circumstances has
occurred. 27 1 A contract between husband and wife cannot prevent the
court from exercising this power and the court can apportion a lump sum
into alimony and child support for this purpose. 77 Parents can justify
271. The father petitioned for a modification of the support decree. Finding that the fa-
ther's salary had not increased as much as support costs, the trial court ordered the wife to
pay $100.00 per month in support and maintenance. In affirming the order, the Virginia
Supreme Court held that the evidence established a material change in condition and cir-
cumstances. The court also noted that in allocating the burden of support between parents,
§ 20-107(1) required the courts to consider, along with other factors, the earning capacity,
obligations and needs, and financial resources of the parties. Id. at 447-48, 258 S.E.2d at
515-16. Justice Carrico dissented because he felt the father had failed to show a material
change in conditions and circumstances. Id. at 448, 258 S.E.2d at 516. See also Annot., 98
A.L.R.3d 1146 (1980).
272. 220 Va. 638, 261 S.E.2d 52 (1979).
273. The former wife was awarded judgment against her former husband for the amount
of child support arrearages and the husband was ordered to keep weekly payments current
even after the child's eighteenth birthday. The father conceded that his contractual obliga-
tion to pay child support continued although the child had reached age of majority, but
argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the support obligation, as modified
by the court, after the child's eighteenth birthday. Id. at 640-41, 261 S.E.2d at 53-54.
274. Id. at 641, 261 S.E.2d at 54.
275. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108 (Repl. Vol. 1975) provides:
The court may, from time to time after decreeing as provided in [§ 20-107], on peti-
tion of either of the parents, or on its own motion or upon petition of any probation
officer or superintendent of public welfare, which petition shall set forth the reasons
for the relief sought, revise and alter such decree concerning the care, custody, and
maintenance of children and make a new decree concerning the same, as the circum-
stances of the parents and the benefit of the children may require.
276. 220 Va. 638, 261 S.E.2d 52 (1979); Featherstone v. Brooks, 220 Va. 443, 258 S.E.2d
513 (1979); Hammers v. Hammers, 216 Va. 30, 216 S.E.2d 20 (1975); Carter v. Carter, 215
Va. 475, 211 S.E.2d 253 (1975). See generally Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 657 (1975). See also Cofer
v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 140 S.E.2d 663 (1965); De Mott v. De Mott, 198 Va. 22, 92 S.E.2d 342
(1956); Morris v. Henry, 193 Va. 631, 70 S.E.2d 417 (1952); Kern v. Lindsey, 182 Va. 775, 30
S.E.2d 707 (1944).
277. Featherstone v. Brooks, 220 Va. 443, 258 S.E.2d 513 (1979); Morris v. Morris, 216 Va.
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reduction of child support on grounds of financial hardship only by dem-
onstrating that their inability to pay was not caused by voluntary choice
or negligence.178
Effective July 1, 1972, the General Assembly reduced the age of major-
ity from 21 to 18 years2 7 9 This amendment triggered a line of cases con-
cerning the effect of this change upon child support orders.2 18 The thread
of decision running through these cases has two strands. The court de-
cides whether the parties' contractual intent is applicable, and if so, then
construes the provisions of the contract to determine that intent. Other-
wise, if the court finds the child support provisions are not supplanted by
later court orders, contractual intent is controlling. 28 1 In Eaton v. Ea-
ton,282 the child support provisions of the contract were supplanted by a
subsequent court decree or order, and the court held that the parties'
contractual intent was inapplicable2 83 Moreover, when the contract is in-
corporated into the divorce decree, as in Meredith v. Meredith,284 a sub-
sequent order revising the amount of the monthly support does not nec-
457, 219 S.E.2d 864 (1975); Hammers v. Hammers, 216 Va. 30, 216 S.E.2d 20 (1975); Carter
v. Carter, 215 Va. 475, 211 S.E.2d 253 (1975). See also Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 153 S.E.
879 (1930). For a discussion of apportionment of unitary awards made pursuant to settle-
ment agreements, see notes 218-23 supra and accompanying text.
278. Featherstone v. Brooks, 220 Va. 443, 258 S.E.2d 253 (1979); Morris v. Morris, 216 Va.
457, 219 S.E.2d 864 (1975); Hammers v. Hammers, 216 Va. 30, 216 S.E.2d 20 (1975).
279. 1972 Va. Acts, chs. 824, 825 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 1-13.42 (Repl. Vol. 1979)).
280. Gazale v. Gazale, 219 Va. 775, 250 S.E.2d 365 (1979); Mack v. Mack, 217 Va. 534, 229
S.E.2d 895 (1976); Meredith v. Meredith, 216 Va. 636, 222 S.E.2d 511 (1976); Eaton v. Ea-
ton, 215 Va. 824, 213 S.E.2d 789 (1975); Paul v. Paul, 214 Va. 651, 203 S.E.2d 123 (1974).
281. Gazale v. Gazale, 219 Va. 775, 778, 250 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1979) (court must enforce
child support payments under terms of settlement agreement if the support provisions are
not supplanted by subsequent court orders).
282. 215 Va. 824, 827, 213 S.E.2d 789, 791-92 (1975). Contract provisions regarding child
support entered prior to the statutory change in the age of majority were supplanted by a
later court order in a divorce suit entered after the change of majority. The Virginia Su-
preme Court held that the court order controlled and the support provisions were not owing
for children over eighteen despite the contract's provisions for payments until age twenty-
one. Also, the court held that the divorce court's jurisdiction over a child terminates ipso
facto when the child reaches majority. The same event terminates, by operation of law, the
prospective effects of a judicial support decree. Id. at 827, 213 S.E.2d at 792.
283. Id. at 827, 213 S.E.2d at 791.
284. 216 Va. 636, 637, 222 S.E.2d 511 (1976). The divorce decree incorporated a contract
requiring the father to support his child "until such child shall reach his majority." The
Virginia Supreme Court construed the intent of the language and held that the parties in-
tended the term of support duty to be no longer than the period imposed by Virginia law,
and the father was therefore relieved of his obligation when the child reached the new age of
majority fixed by the statute. Accord, Mack v. Mack, 217 Va. 534, 229 S.E.2d 895 (1976).
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essarily "supplant" the contract provisions regarding child support.285
In Gazale v. Gazale,2 8 the supreme court articulated the thread of de-
cision and concluded that the consent decree served only to amend,
rather than supplant, the child support provisions of the parties' con-
tract.28 7 Therefore, the parties' intent was the controlling factor. The
court construed the contract and determined that the parties intended
that the husband's monthly support obligation should continue as long as
the daughter was in the mother's custody and had not reached twenty-
one.2 8 The Virginia Supreme Court's reasoning appears to be in step with
the decisions of other jurisdictions.2 89
8. Enforcement of Maintenance and Support Decrees
The Virginia Supreme Court decided several cases in this area during
the 1970's. In the previously discussed case of Werner v. Common-
wealth,290 the court recognized that juvenile and domestic relations courts
are particularly well equipped to supervise the collection of support pay-
ments from recalcitrant husbands, as evidenced by code section 20-79(c)
which authorizes courts of record to refer such matters to juvenile and
domestic relations courts. In Winn v. Winn, 91 the court followed the gen-
eral rule that before a person may be held in contempt for violating a
court order, the order must be in definite terms as to the duties thereby
imposed upon him and the command must be express rather than im-
plied.29 2 Since the parties' settlement agreement did not state expressly
285. 216 Va. at 638, 222 S.E.2d at 512.
286. 219 Va. 775, 250 S.E.2d 365 (1979).
287. Id. at 778, 250 S.E.2d at 367.
288. As a result, the consent decree did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to order
the former husband to provide support beyond his daughter's age of majority. Id. at 799-80,
250 S.E.2d at 367-68. See also Cutshaw v. Cutshaw, 220 Va. 638, 641, 261 S.E. 52, 54 (1979)
(parents can contract to support minor child beyond child's age of majority).
289. See Collins v. Collins, 418 S.W.2d 739 (Ky. 1961), Barbier v. Barbier, 45 Mich. App.
402, 206 N.W.2d 464 (1973); Shoal v. Shoaf, 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1972); Hastings v.
Hastings, 328 A.2d 782 (N.H. 1974); Mason v. Mason, 84 N.M. 720, 507 P.2d 781 (1973);
Parker v. Parker, 497 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. 1973); Whitt v. Whitt, 490 S.W.2d 159 (Tenn.
1973).
290. 212 Va. 623, 186 S.E.2d 76 (1972). See notes 84-87 supra and accompanying text. See
also Gowen v. Wilkerson, 364 F. Supp. 1043 (W.D. Va. 1973) (federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding by husband held in contempt of state court for his failure to comply with a support
order).
291. 218 Va. 8, 235 S.E.2d 307 (1977).
292. Id. at 10, 235 S.E.2d at 309 (quoting Wood v. Goodson, 253 Ark. 196, 203, 485
S.W.2d 213, 217 (1972)). See Taliaferro v. Horde's Adm'r, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 242, 247 (1822)
("the process for contempt lies for disobedience of what is decreed, not for what may be
decreed"). See generally Comment, Lack of Due Process in Virginia Contempt Proceedings
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that it was the husband's duty to procure hospitalization insurance guar-
anteeing his divorced wife substantially the same benefits she had en-
joyed prior to the divorce, the husband did not violate a clearly defined
duty and his actions did not constitute contempt when he failed to obtain
a policy which would have covered his wife after their divorce becamefinal.293
The Virginia Supreme Court interpreted sections of the Virginia enact-
ment of the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(RURESA)294 in two recent cases concerning foreign divorce decrees. In
Alig v. Alig,2 9 5 a divorced wife sought enforcement of the alimony provi-
sions of a Maryland divorce decree and the payment of arrearages. The
trial court denied her petition for arrearages on the grounds of equitable
estoppel but ordered the husband to resume monthly alimony pay-
ments.2 96 The supreme court noted that, although Virginia courts are not
compelled under the full faith and credit clause to recognize and enforce
a Maryland divorce decree for alimony which was subject to modification,
such a decree could, upon the principle of comity, be recognized and
treated with the same force and effect as if it were entered in Virginia.2 97
Of greater significance, however, was the court's holding that RURESA
for Failure to Comply with Order for Support and Alimony, 4 U. RICH. L. REV. 128 (1969).
See also French v. Pobst, 203 Va. 704, 710, 127 S.E.2d 137, 141 (1962).
293. 218 Va. at 10-11, 235 S.E.2d at 308-09. The settlement agreement required the hus-
band to maintain a certain group hospitalization policy covering his wife or a similar policy
containing substantially the same benefits for two years. The husband maintained his group
hospitalization policy, but the insurer refused to pay his wife's claim when it discovered her
divorce had become final. The Virginia Supreme Court rejected the wife's argument that
maintenance of the husband's policy did not satisfy his contractual obligation because it did
not carry out the intent of the parties, that after the divorce she would be protected by
insurance to the same degree as when she was married. Id.
294. 1952 Va. Acts, ch. 516 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-88.12 to -.31 (Repl. Vol. 1975
& Cum. Supp. 1980). The purposes of RURESA "are to improve and extend by reciprocal
legislation the enforcement of duties of support and to make" applicable laws uniform. VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-88.12 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
295. 220 Va. 80, 255 S.E.2d 494 (1979).
296. The wife travelled to Virginia and telephoned her husband that she "had had
enough of him, his children and his money." The husband ceased making alimony payments
afterwards. The children previously had been taken from the wife by juvenile authorities.
She returned to Maryland by cab, paying $1,000.00 for her fare. Later that day she was
taken into custody by police and placed in a psychiatric hospital, where she remained for
several months. Id. at 82-83, 255 S.E.2d at 496.
297. Id. at 84, 255 S.E. 2d at 497 (quoting McKeel v. McKeel, 185 Va. 108, 113, 37 S.E.2d
746, 749 (1946)). See Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955); Light v.
Light, 12 IMI. 2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1957); Mosher v. Mosher, 25 Wash. 2d 778, 172 P.2d
259 (1946); Annot., 132 A.L.R. 1272 (1941). See also notes 89-121 supra and accompanying
text.
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required a state court to recognize and enforce a foreign alimony decree
even though the full faith and credit clause did not so require. 98 The Alig
decision was dispositive of the issue in Scott v. Sylvester,29" where the
trial court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to enter judgment for arrear-
ages except for the time the husband was in Virginia. Reiterating Alig's
liberal construction of RURESA and citing cases from other jurisdictions,
the supreme court held that the trial court committed reversible error by
defeating the intent and purpose of RURESA.3 00 Aig and Sylvester indi-
cate that the Virginia Supreme Court will fully utilize the provisions of
RURESA in order to provide support and maintenance for spouses and
dependent children.
III. THE FAMILY
A. Illegitimate Children
1. Child Support Orders
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Brown v. Commonwealth Ex Rel.
Custis,30' added to Virginia's tradition of both legislative and judicial pro-
tection of the rights of children, notwithstanding the marital problems of
the parents. 02 "The dispositive issue in [Brown was] whether the pater-
nity of a child not born of a lawful marriage [could] be determined in any
manner other than in accordance with the provisions of code section 20-
298. 220 Va. at 84, 255 S.E.2d at 497 (quoting §§ 20-88.13(14), -88.30:6(a)). The court
held that the trial court was required by due process to consider any questions of modifica-
tion raised by either party which could have been presented to the Maryland courts. Like-
wise, "Alig was under a clear duty to comply with the terms of the alimony decree until
modified by a further court order, and he could not escape this duty merely by relying upon
the erratic statements and actions of an emotionally unstable person." Id. at 85, 255 S.E.2d
at 497 (citing Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 233-34 (1946).
299. 220 Va. 182, 257 S.E,2d 774, 775-76 (1979).
300. Id. at 185, 257 S.E.2d at 776-77. See Woodson v. Commonwealth Util., Inc., 209 Va.
72, 74, 161 S.E.2d 669, 670 (1968). See also Engelson v. Mallea, 180 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Iowa
1970); Childers v. Childers, 9 N.C. App. 220, 224-25, 198 S.E.2d 485, 488 (1973); Barrow v.
Barrow, 220 Tenn. 491, 495, 419 S.W.2d 164, 165-66 (1967); Raney v. Raney, 536 S.W.2d
617, 619 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976); Yetter v. Commeau, 84 Wash. 2d 155, 524 P.2d 901 (1974).
301. 218 Va. 40, 235 S.E.2d 325 (1977).
302. 1976-1977 Virginia Survey, supra note 138, at 1418-19. See McClaugherty v. Mc-
Claugherty, 180 Va. 51, 21 S.E.2d 761 (1942); accord, State v. Bragg, 152 W.Va. 372, 163
S.E.2d 685 (1968). See generally Helmholz, Support Orders, Church Courts, and the Rule
of Filius Nullius: A Reassessment of the Common Law, 63 VA. L. REv. 431 (1977); Johnson,
Inheritance Rights of Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. Rav. 275, 281-84 (1978); see also
Heflin v. Heflin, 177 Va. 385, 14 S.E.2d 317 (1941); Goodman v. Goodman, 150 Va. 42, 45,
142 S.E.2d 412, 413 (1928); Stones v. Keeling, 9 Va. (5 Call) 143, 146 (1804).
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61.1, which concerns the support of the children of unwed parents. 30 3
Mrs. Custis and Brown were married in 1972 while the former was still
married to her first husband. Brown left their marital home after five
weeks of cohabitation to serve in the armed forces. He returned in 1973
and lived with Mrs. Custis until July of 1974. Mrs. Custis testified that
she had sexual relations solely with Brown during this period. Brown de-
nied paternity when the child was born, and Mrs. Custis thereupon peti-
tioned for child support. The lower court awarded her support after find-
ing that the infant was the issue of a void marriage (i.e., bigamous
marriage) between Brown and Mrs. Custis, and that the child was
deemed to be legitimate, pursuant to former code section 64.1-7.s °
303. 218 Va. at 41, 235 S.E.2d at 326. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-61.1 (1975 Repl. Vol. & Cum.
Supp. 1980) provides that:
Whenever in proceedings hereafter under this chapter concerning a child whose par-
ents are not married, a man admits before any court having jurisdiction to try and
dispose of the same, that he is the father of the child or the court finds that the man
has voluntarily admitted paternity in writing, under oath, or if it be shown by other
evidence beyond reasonable doubt that he is the father of the child and that he
should be responsible for the support of the child, the court may then enter and
enforce judgment for the support, maintenance and education of such child as if the
child were born in lawful wedlock.
Such other evidence that the man is the father of the child shall be limited to
evidence of the following.
(1) That he cohabited openly with the mother during all of the ten months immedi-
ately prior to the time the child was born; or
(2) That he gave consent to a physician or other person, not including the mother,
charged with the responsibility of securing information for the preparation of a birth
record that his name be used as the father of the child upon the birth records of the
child; or
(3) That he allowed by a general course of conduct the common use of his surname
by the child; or
(4) That he claimed the child as his child on any statement, tax return or other
document filed and signed by him with any local, State or federal government or any
agency thereof.
The findings of a court hereunder shall not be used against the man in any manner
except for specific purposes of this chapter and for the purposes of descent and distri-
bution pursuant to Title 64.1.
Notwithstanding the provisions of § 19.2-271 or any other law, the judge or other
court officer before whom a man has admitted paternity of any child, whose support
is the subject of any proceeding brought under the provisions of this chapter, may
testify, in any court having jurisdiction to conduct proceedings under this chapter, as
to any admission of paternity made by such man in his court and as to any other
facts directly affecting the relevancy or probative value of such admission.
304. 218 Va. at 41, 235 S.E.2d at 326. Former § 64.1-7 provided that the issue of mar-
riages deemed null in law were nevertheless legitimate. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-31.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1980) (originally codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-7 (Repl. Vol. 1973)).
1981]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Brown contended on appeal that former code section 64.1-7 should not
affect the question of paternity because it was enacted for the benefit of
children of bigamous marriages and was not intended to affect the rights
of parents.30 5 According to Brown, code section 20-61.1 was the applicable
statute to determine paternity of the infant because he and Mrs. Custis
were unmarried as a result of their bigamous marriage which was void ab
initio. Brown argued that his paternity had not been proven by Mrs. Cus-
tis in the manner provided by statute because he had not voluntarily ad-
mitted his paternity. He also contended that his paternity of the infant
had not been established by other evidence admissible under code section20-61.1(1)-(4).306
The supreme court rejected Brown's contention that Code section 20-
61.1 was applicable or that it was the only means by which paternity
could be established. The court interpreted this section and its strict
proof requirements of paternity to apply expressly to proceedings dealing
with desertion and nonsupport, and it noted that the legislature was "re-
ferring to and providing for the support of the offspring of a meretricious
union between a man and a woman."307 The court then emphasized that
it was not dealing with the offspring of a meretricious relationship but
with the child of an actual, albeit void, marriage which was solemnized in
a formal manner. 0 8 Noting that it had on numerous occasions held that a
child should not be deprived of his rights because of statutes affecting the
marital status of his parent, the court held that the child in Brown was
not excluded from the benefits of former code section 64.1-7 because that
section was enacted for the purpose of protecting such children. Brown
was therefore prevented from invoking code section 20-61.1, which con-
cerned unwed parents, because the evidence showed conclusively that a
marriage was performed and that he did enter into the marriage
relationship.3 09
305. 218 Va. at 42, 235 S.E.2d at 326-27.
306. Id. at 43, 235 S.E.2d at 328. In essence, the court noted, Brown's position was that
"in the absence of an express admission of paternity it [paternity] must be proved: that
since his marriage ... was void ab initio, they were not married, and that his paternity of
the child could be established only by the type of evidence outlined in § 20-61.1." Id. at 42,
235 S.E.2d at 327 (emphasis added).
307. Id. at 43, 235 S.E.2d at 328. The court noted that the reason that Code § 20-61.1
required strict and limited proof of paternity was "presumably to protect a man from a
specious claim of fatherhood made by a woman who has not entered into a marital relation-
ship with the man." Id.
308. Id. at 44, 235 S.E.2d at 328.
309. Id. See Goodman v. Goodman, 150 Va. 42, 45, 142 S.E. 412, 413 (1928) (remedial
purpose of the statutory ancestors of §§ 64.1-6, .1-7, 20-42 was to remove the stain and
disabilities of bastardy from innocent and unoffending children); Stones v. Keeling, 9 Va. (5
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The court likewise rejected the far-reaching effect of Brown's position
that, absent an admission of paternity by the father in the manner pro-
vided by code section 20-61.1, there must be evidence that he cohabited
openly with Mrs. Custis during the entire ten months immediately prior
to the child's birth.3 10 Stating that it would have to ignore the humanita-
rian principles upon which former code section 64.1-7 were based if it
denied a court of equity the right to accord the child in Brown the benefit
of that section, the supreme court concluded that when the legislature
enacted code section 20-61.1 and related sections, "it did not intend to
impair the jurisdiction of a court of equity to determine in a proper pro-
ceeding for the support of an infant, whether such child is 'the issue' of 'a
null marriage.' "311
The court then cited an early Virginia case regarding children born of a
bigamous marriage and applied the "access" rule developed in that
case.3 12 Since there was uncontroverted evidence that Brown had sole "ac-
cess" to Mrs. Custis during the time the child 'was conceived, the trial
court was not clearly erroneous in finding that Brown was the father of
the child born to Mrs. Custis. Accordingly, the supreme court held that
the child was the legitimate issue of a voidmarriage and entitled to be
supported by her father.3 13
2. Workmen's Compensation Death Benefits
A rationale similar to Brown was applied in the recent case of Allstate
Messenger Serv. v. James,14 in which the illegitimate child of an em-
ployee who had suffered an industrial accident claimed death benefits.
The court held that the evidentiary standards for paternity in code sec-
tion 20-60.1 were not the only means of establishing paternity; indeed,
code section 20-61.1 was not applicable to claims by illegitimate children
for workman's compensation benefits. The court then applied code sec-
tion 65.1-66 and held that the testimony of three witnesses was sufficient,
to establish that the claimant was an "acknowledged illegitimate child"
Call.) 143, 146 (1804) (strong case to show the sense of the legislature that the turpitude or
guilt of a bigamous marriage should not fall upon the heads of innocent offspring).
310. 218 Va. at 44-45, 235 S.E.2d at 328-29.
311. Id. at 45, 235 S.E.2d at 329. The court also noted that it had on numerous occasions
held that sections addressing desertion and nonsupport did not usurp the inherent jurisdic-
tion of equity to deal with the questions of support and maintenance. Id. at 46, 235 S.E.2d
at 329; accord, McClaugherty v. McClaugherty, 180 Va. 51, 65-66, 21 S.E.2d 761 (1942);
State v. Bragg, 152 W. Va. 372, 163 S.E.2d 685 (1968).
312. Stones v. Keeling, 9 Va. (5 Call.) 143, 148-49 (1804).
313. 218 Va. at 48, 235 S.E.2d at 331.
314. __ Va. __, 266 S.E.2d 86 (1980).
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and entitled to workmen's compensation benefits. 315 Brown and Allstate
Messenger Service indicate that the Virginia Supreme Court will not al-
low statutes designed to prevent fraud in one situation to permit a father
in another situation to escape his support obligation or to deny author-
ized death benefits to an illegitimate child.
As shown in Brown, 16 as well as in T... v. T...,317 the common law
rule excluding testimony by either spouse as to nonaccess has been abro-
gated by statute. 18 T. . . v. T. . . presented the novel question of
whether a former husband, who knew when he married his wife that she
was pregnant by another person, had a continuing obligation to support
the child after their divorce.3 ' 9 The court found that the necessary ele-
ments of equitable estoppel were present, and held that the express oral
contract between the parties regarding child support estopped the hus-
band from pleading the statute of frauds.3 20
3. Wrongful Death Bnefits
The Virginia Supreme Court has also protected the interests of iflegiti-
315. Id. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 87. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.1-66 (Repl. Vol. 1980) provides, in
pertinent part, that an acknowledged illegitimate child shall be conclusively presumed to be
a dependent wholly dependent for support upon the deceased employee.
316. 218 Va. at 43, 48, 235 S.E.2d at 327, 330.
317. 216 Va. 867, 869, 224 S.E.2d 148, 150 (1976); accord, Cassady v. Martin, - Va.
266 S.E.2d 104, 106 (1980).
318. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-82 and 88.29 (Repl. Vol. 1975) provide that in prosecutions
under chapter 5 (desertion and nonsupport) both husband and wife shall be competent wit-
nesses to testify against each other in all relevant matters, including the facts of their
marriage.
319. 216 Va. at 868, 224 S.E.2d at 149. The trial court granted the wife a divorce a
vinculo matrimonii on the ground of the husband's desertion but relieved the husband of
any duty to support the child.
320. Id. at 873, 224 S.E.2d at 152. The woman became pregnant while unmarried and
planned to move to another state in order to put her baby up for adoption. She obtained
employment in New York. The man, with full knowledge of her pregnancy, promised he
would care for the child as his own if she would forego her plans and marry him. She there-
upon married him in 1968, and the child was born in 1969. The father's name was placed on
the child's birth certificate with his approval, and he listed the child as a dependent for
purposes of receiving additional pay and allowances from the U.S. Navy. The father permit-
ted the child to use his name for more than four years; he held himself out to the public as
her father; and he listed the child as a dependent on the couple's tax returns. Id. at 868, 224
S.E.2d at 149. See L._ v. L._, 497 S.W.2d 840 (Mo. 1973) (former husband liable for child
support under express oral contract). Contra, Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767 (D.C. App. 1968)
(promise not to reject wife's child by another was no more than inducement to marry and
only a commitment to support child during marriage). See generally Clevenger v. Clevenger,
189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1961); Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal. 2d 210, 317 P.2d
613 (1957); Taylor v. Taylor, 279 So. 2d 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
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mate children in wrongful death actions. Carroll v. Snead321 involved an
action by an illegitimate child against the administrator of her father's
estate to share in the recovery for the wrongful death of her father. For
the first time, the Virginia Supreme Court liberally construed the word
"children" as used in the Virginia wrongful death statute to include the
illegitimate child of a father whose death gave rise to a wrongful death
action.3 22 The decedent's acknowledged illegitimate child was accordingly
entitled to the amount recovered by the decedent's administrator, rather
than the decedent's parents, or brothers and sisters, because she was the
decedent's only beneficiary of the first class.3 23
The supreme court extended its scope of protection to the family of
illegitimate children in Edwards v. Syrkes, 24 where the administrator of
the estate of an eight year old decedent appealed the inadequacy of a
wrongful death award. 25 Agreeing with the administrator's contention,
the court held that it was error to admit prejudicial evidence regarding
the illegitimacy of the decedent and his half-sister and the half-sister's
premarital pregnancy. Such evidence did not tend to show any lack of
affection by the mother and half-sister toward the decedent, or that his
321. 211 Va. 640, 179 S.E.2d 620 (1971). The trial court held that the child, being illegiti-
mate, was not entitled under former § 8-636 to share in the recovery of the wrongful death
of her father. Id. at 641, 179 S.E.2d at 621. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636 (Cum. Supp. 1966)
(currently codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-52, -53 (Repl. Vol. 1977 and Cum. Supp.
1980)). The trial court also distinguished Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), which held
that a Louisiana statute excluding illegitimate children from participation in a recovery for
the wrongful death of their mother denied the children equal protection. 211 Va. at 641, 179
S.E.2d at 621.
322. 211 Va. at 644, 179 S.E.2d at 623. The Virginia Supreme Court requested that oppos-
ing counsel file supplemental briefs directed to the question whether the term "children" as
used in former § 8-636 included illegitimate children irrespective of any constitutional con-
sideration. The court did not consider whether Levy was applicable. 211 Va. at 641, 644 n.3,
179 S.E.2d at 621, 623 n.3. See also Domestic Relations, 1970-1971 Virginia Survey, 57 VA.
L. REv. 1487, 1491-92 (1971).
323. 211 Va. at 641, 179 S.E.2d at 621. The court's decision was controlled by Withrow v.
Edwards, 181 Va. 344, 25 S.E.2d 343, reversed in part and remanded, 181 Va. 592, 25
S.E.2d 899, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 761 (1943) (child illegitimate in South Carolina but legiti-
mate in Virginia entitled to share in a recovery for the wrongful death of her father).
324. 211 Va. 600, 179 S.E.2d 902 (1971).
325. Herman Williams was eight years of age when he was struck and killed by an auto-
mobile driven by the defendant. The administrator of decedent's estate instituted an action
against the defendant to recover for wrongful death. The jury returned a verdict and judg-
ment for $1,000.00 in favor of the administrator, which was divided equally between the
decedent's mother and half-sister. The administrator contended that the award of damages
was grossly inadequate as the result of the error of the trial court in admitting highly preju-
dicial evidence which revealed the illegitimacy of the decedent and his half-sister and the
pre-marital pregnancy of his half-sister. Id. at 600-01, 179 S.E.2d at 902-03.
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death brought them no sorrow, suffering or mental anguish. Since the
prejudicial effect of the evidence on the jury exceeded its probative value,
the judgment was set aside and the case remanded for a new trial on the
question of damages alone. 26
Although the Virginia Supreme Court is diligent in protecting the in-
terests of illegitimate children and their families,32" the court still re-
quires that a claimant of wrongful death benefits establish paternity. In
Cassady v. Martin,32 8 the supreme court held that the trial court erred in
ruling as a matter of law that the claimant of wrongful death benefits was
the decedent's putative child. Since the claimant had the burden of prov-
ing that the decedent was his parent, paternity was a question for the
jury to decide. 2 9
B. Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption
1. Introduction
The consent of the natural parents is usually required in adoption pro-
ceedings, and most adoption statutes require proof that the child has
been abandoned or neglected, or that certain other defined conditions ex-
ist (e.g., abuse) before the parent's rights may be involuntarily termi-
nated.330 The United States Supreme Court has likewise recognized that a
326. Id. at 601, 179 S.E.2d at 903.
327. The federal district courts in Virginia have likewise protected the interests of illegiti-
mate children. See, e.g., Kasey v. Richardson, 331 F. Supp. 580 (W.D. Va. 1971) (daughter
of marriage deemed null at law, i.e., common law marriage, legitimate within meaning of
former § 64.1-7 and for social security purposes). For a discussion of Kasey, see Domestic
Relations, 1971-1972 Virginia Survey, 58 VA. L. REV. 1257, 1259-60 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as 1971-1972 Virginia Survey].
328. - Va. -, 266 S.E.2d 104 (1980).
329. Id. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 106. The administratrix of a decedents estate brought a
wrongful death action on behalf of the decedent's putative child. The defendant appealed
after the trial court ruled as a matter of law that the claimant was the decedent's putative
child. Id. at -, 266 S.E.2d at 105. The court also held that the mother of the child by the
decedent could testify regarding the non-access by her legal husband. Id. at -, 266 S.E.2d
at 106-07.
330. CLARK, supra note 12, at §§ 18.3-.5. Simpson, The Unfit Parent: Conditions Under
Which a Child May be Adopted Without Consent of His Parents, 39 U. Dar. L. REv. 347
(1962). It is important to note that the legal process of adoption (by which a child acquires
parents other than his natural parents and parents acquire a child other than a natural
child) involves two separate steps: (1) the termination of parental rights and obligations
which formerly existed; (2) the formation of a legal bond between the child and the adoptive
parents. CLARK, supra note 12, at § 18.1. See generally VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-222 to -238
(Repl. Vol. 1980). For an extensive discussion of the Virginia statute on termination of pa-
rental rights, see Comment, Termination of Parental Rights-An Analysis of Virginia's
Statute, 15 U. RicH. L. REv. 213 (1980).
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natural parent's relationship with his or her child is "cognizable and sub-
stantial" and thus protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment 31
Virginia is one of the few states which permit children to be adopted
when it is found that parental consent has been withheld contrary to the
best interests of the child .3 2  Code section 16.1-283(c) also authorizes the
termination of residual parental rights when a court finds that a child has
been neglected or abused or placed in foster care as a result of an entrust-
ment agreement or other voluntary relinquishment.3s3 In a line of deci-
sions during the 1970's, the Virginia Supreme Court examined and bal-
anced the "cognizable and substantial" rights of natural parents against
the best interests of the child as well as the adoptive parents and the
state.334
331. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), where the United States Supreme Court held
that, under the equal protection clause, a state could not presume that unwed fathers were
unfit as parents, id. at 658, and that, as a matter of due process, the father was entitled to a
hearing in an adoption proceeding concerning his fitness as a parent, id. at 649-58. Cf. Quil-
loin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (state's "best interest of child" standard adequately
protected rights of unwed natural father). See also People ex rel. S.S.T., 39 Colo. App. 110,
553 P.2d 82 (1976); Adoption of Ekstrom, 24 A.D.2d 276, 265 N.Y.S.2d 727 (1965), appeal
dismissed, 17 N.Y.2d 655, 216 N.E.2d 604, 269 N.Y.S.2d 444, aff'd on rehearing, 51 Misc. 2d
731, 273 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1966); 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 93 (1972). For a
discussion of the rights of natural parents, see Simpson, supra note 330; Comment, Termi-
nation of Parental Rights in Adoption Cases: Focusing on the Child, 14 J. FAI. L. 547
(1975-76); Note, In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of the Natural Parent in Child Place-
ment Proceedings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 446 (1976).
332. CLARK, supra note 12, § 18.5 at 629 n.1.; Gordon, Terminal Placements of Children
and Permanent Termination of Parental Rights: The New York Permanent Neglect Stat-
ute, 46 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 215, 220-21 nA1 (1971) (Virginia is listed as one of the four
jurisdictions which dispense with consent when withholding consent is contrary to the
child's best interest. The other three jurisdictions are Arizona, the District of Columbia and
Maryland). See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225(c) (Repl. Vol. 1980) which provides, in pertinent
part that, "if after hearing evidence, the court finds that the valid consent of any person or
agency whose consent is... required is withheld contrary to the best interests of the child
or is unobtainable, the court may grant the petition without such consent."
333. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283(c) (Repl. VoL 1980).
334. Weaver v. Roanoke Dept. of Human Resources, - Va. _ 265 S.E.2d 692 (1980)
(distinction between order terminating parental custodial rights and order terminating
residual parental rights); Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120, 253 S.E.2d 658 (1979) (parental rights
cannot be terminated without a finding of parental unfitness); Shank v. Dept. of Social Ser-
vices, 217 Va. 506, 230 S.E.2d 454 (1976) (court order terminating parental rights severs all
parental rights); Harry v. Fisher, 216 Va. 530, 221 S.E.2d 118 (1976) (best interest of child
should be promoted where valid consent is given but subsequently revoked); Berrien v.
Green Co. Dept. of Public Welfare, 216 Va. 241, 217 S.E.2d 854 (1975) (parental rights may
not be terminated without a finding of parental unfitness); Rocka v. Roanoke Co. Dept. of
Welfare, 215 Va. 515, 211 S.E.2d 76 (1975) (parental rights may not be terminated without a
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2. Dual Approach Followed in Custody and Adoption Proceedings
A dual approach has evolved throughout the court's decisions regarding
custody and adoption. This approach was first articulated in Malpass v.
Morgan,"3 5 where the court expressed its new standard in the following
terms:
Where, as here, there is no question of the fitness of the non-consenting
parent and he has not by conduct or previous legal action lost his rights to
the child, it must be shown that continuance of the relationship between
the two would be detrimental to the child's welfare. 336
While articulating the established rule that in custody and adoption
cases the welfare of the child is of paramount concern and takes prece-
dence over the rights of parents, the court also added the following
condition:
There is, however a condition to the rule in custody cases where the context
is between parent and non-parent, and we believe the condition should ap-
ply equally in adoption cases. The condition is that the rights of parents
may not be lightly severed but are to be respected if at all consonant with
the best interests of the child.3 3 7
finding of parental unfitness); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 215 Va. 49, 205 S.E.2d 644 (1974)
(putative father's parental rights not consonant with illegitimate daughter's best interest);
Szemler v. Clements, 214 Va. 639, 202 S.E.2d 880 (1974) (best interest of child should be
promoted where valid consent is given but subsequently revoked); Malpass v. Morgan, 213
Va. 393, 192 S.E.2d 794 (1972) (parental rights cannot be severed without finding of paren-
tal unfitness); Dyer v. Howell, 212 Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 789 (1971) (prior court order divested
parent of custodial rights and burden was on parent to prove that circumstances had so
changed that it would be in children's best interests to restore custody to parent).
335. 213 Va. 393, 192 S.E.2d 794 (1972), where Malpass refused to consent to adoption of
his child by his former wife's new husband. Without finding Malpass unfit or guilty of any
conduct which would have required forfeiture of his parental rights, trial court held that his
consent to adoption was being withheld contrary to the best interests of the child. The
supreme court reversed the court Qrdered adoption and held that the rights of parents can-
not be lightly severed but are to be respected if consonant with the best interests of the
child. Id. at 395-99, 192 S.E.2d at 796-99. For an excellent analysis of this case, see Com-
ment, Malpass v. Morgan: Determining When a Parent's Consent to Adoption is Being
Withheld Contrary to the Best Interests of the Child, 60 VA. L. REv. 718 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Parent's Consent to Adoption].
336. 213 Va. at 399, 192 S.E.2d at 799.
337. Id. (citations omitted). Malpass was a retrenchment from the court's prior holding in
Dyer v. Howell, 212 Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 789 (1971), where an adoption was upheld over the
objections of a natural parent. The court in Dyer implied that it would give little weight to
any inherent parental interest in the child and would only require a showing that the adop-
tion was in the child's best interest. For a discussion of Dyer, see 1971-1972 Virginia Sur-
vey, supra note 327, at 1263-64; Parent's Consent to Adoption, supra note 335, at 718-20.
See also notes 260-264 supra and accompanying text for discussion of custody issue in Dyer.
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In view of this dual approach, the court has repeatedly held that unless
the nonparent in an adoption (or custody proceeding) demonstrates that
a continuation of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to
the child, the language in code section 63.1-225(c) forbids an adoption
(and necessarily, the termination of parental rights of a nonconsenting
parent through an adoption proceeding) where there is no finding that
the nonconsenting parent is unfit and the parent has not been deprived of
his rights to the child by conduct or previous legal action 35
This rule is also applied in situations where a local department of
public welfare or social services is attempting to terminate the rights of
natural parents. In Berrien v. Green County Department of Public Wel-
fare,339 the juvenile court awarded custody of Berrien's child and adop-
tion rights to the county Department of Public Welfare. However, there
was no clear and convincing evdence that the natural mother was unfit at
the time of the hearing. The burden of proving her own fitness had been
placed on the mother.340
The supreme court reversed the custody award and stated that the par-
ent prevails in custody and adoption cases between a parent and a non-
parent "unless the non-parent bears the burden of proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, both that the parent is unfit and that the best inter-
est of the child will be promoted by granting custody to the non-par-
ent. '341 Finding that the child had been the "pawn of contending forces"
for more than half her life, the court, rather than remanding the case for
another evidentiary hearing, ordered that custody of the child be restored
to her natural mother.s-" In so doing, the Virginia Supreme Court recog-
nized the unique status of parenthood and subordinated the role of ex-
pert opinion in determining the welfare of children. The holding also "ev-
idences judicial impatience with those who would disturb too readily the
parent-child relationship." 4s
338. Weaver v. Roanoke Dept. of Human Resources, - Va. _-, 265 S.E.2d 692, 694-95
n.1 (1980) (citing Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120, 1124, 253 S.E.2d 658, 661 (1979); Malpass v.
Morgan, 213 Va. 393, 399, 192 S.E.2d 794, 799 (1972)).
339. 216 Va. 241, 217 S.E.2d 854 (1975).
340. Id. at 243-44, 217 S.E.2d at 855-56.
341. Id. at 244, 217 S.E.2d at 856 (quoting Rocka v. Roanoke Co. Dep't of Welfare, 215
Va. 515, 518, 211 S.E.2d 76, 78 (1975) (county board of public welfare granted permanent
custody of two children, but finding that such custody would be to the benefit and welfare
of the children was not the equivalent of the requisite finding that the mother was an unfit
parent).
342. 216 Va. at 244, 217 S.E.2d 857 (1975).
343. 1975-1976 Virginia Survey, supra note 163, at 1433.
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3. Parental Intervention in Adoption Proceedings
Where valid parental consent has been given but is subsequently re-
voked, as in Harry v. Fisher3 4 and Szemler v. Clements,3" the court has
upheld the granting of adoptions which promote the child's best interests.
As the court noted in Weavfer v. Roanoke Department of Human Re-
sources, 3 4  once a final order divesting a parent of custodial rights has
been entered, the burden is on the natural parent seeking custody to
show that circumstances have so changed that it would be in the best
interests of the child to restore custody to the parent. 47
In Shank v. Department of Social Services,s34 the supreme court held
that a natural parent has no right to intervene in adoption proceedings
subsequent to a decree permanently separating the child from his par-
ent.s 9 The lower court's decision in Shank that the natural mother lost
344. 216 Va. 530, 531-32, 221 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1976). In a custody dispute between child's
natural and adoptive parents, the natural mother attempted to revoke her consent. Adop-
tive parents proved by preponderance of evidence that adoption was in child's best interests
and court denied natural mother's attempt to regain custody.
345. 214 Va. 639, 644-45, 202 S.E.2d 880, 884 (1974). When the execution of a valid con-
sent for adoption, within the meaning of § 63.1-225, is proved, the natural parents will be
denied custody of the child in a contest with adoptive parents provided the adoptive parents
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the child's best interests will be served if
it remains in their custody. For discussion of Szemler and Fisher, see Domestic Relations,
1973-1974 Virginia Survey, 60 VA. L. Rv. 1529 (1974); 1975-1976 Virginia Survey, supra
note 163, at 1431-32.
346. - Va. -, 265 S.E.2d 692 (1980).
347. Id. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hayes, 215 Va. 49, 52-54, 205 S.E.2d 644, 646-48 (1974)
where an illegitimate female child was placed for adoption with her mother's consent but
the putative father claimed custody. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed the custody
award to the father, and held that a putative father was not entitled to custody without a
finding of parental fitness. The court further held that Hayes was an unfit parent to be
given custody. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (father entitled to a hearing concern-
ing his fitness as a matter of due process in adoption proceeding) was held to be inapplica-
ble in Hayes because, in Stanley, the mother had died and the putative father had estab-
lished a familial and custodial relationship with his children. The putative father in Hayes
had never seen his child or supported her. Thus the due process hearing requirement in
Stanley was inapposite. The court in Hayes also held that, regardless of how Stanley is to
be applied, it certainly did not stand for the proposition that a putative father who was in
fact unfit was nonetheless entitled to child custody. 215 Va. at 53, 205 S.E.2d at 647. See
generally Note, Adoption: The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers, 40 LA. L. REv. 923
(1980).
348. 217 Va. 506, 230 S.E.2d 454 (1976).
349. Id. at 510-11, 230 S.E.2d at 456-57. After reports of child abuse, the plaintiff's two
infants were removed by the state in 1971 and placed in protective custody. The trial court
permanently separated the infants from their mother, and the children were placed in the
foster care of their paternal uncle and his wife in 1973. When the foster parents sought
adoption of the children in 1975, the natural mother filed a petition for custody upon the
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all right to custody as a result of the prior proceeding was affirmed. The
severance of her custody rights made the mother "a legal stranger" to the
children.35 0 The mother would be allowed to intervene in the adoption
proceeding only if she had a claim of right to adopt or could show unfit-
ness of the adopting couple. Since she failed to pursue either course, the
court denied her intervention.3 51 One commentator has observed that the
Shank decision, by ending parental rights after the state assumes cus-
tody, but before the adoption proceedings, balances the interests of the
child, the natural parents, and the prospective adoptive parents and
reaches a solution which demonstrates compassion for all the parties.3 52
4. Termination of Residual Parental Rights
The recent case of Weaver v. Roanoke Department of Human Ser-
vices35 3 is especially noteworthy because the court distinguished the pa-
rental burden of showing changed circumstances to justify a change in
custody35 from the burden of demonstrating that residual parental
rights355 should not be terminated.3 56 Pursuant to code section 16.1-
ground of a material change in circumstances and also sought to enjoin the adoption pro-
ceedings. Id. at 507-08, 230 S.E.2d at 455-56. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (Cur. Supp.
1980) (replacing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-178 (Repl. VoL 1975)).
350. 217 Va. at 509, 230 S.E.2d at 457.
351. Id. at 510-11, 230 S.E.2d at 457.
352. 1976-1977 Virginia Survey, supra note 138, at 1424. See also Carson v. Elrod, 411 F.
Supp. 645 (E.D. Va. 1976) (mother was not entitled to notice or opportunity to be heard
prior to her child's adoption where she had been permanently divested of custody of her
child by lawful court order). For other federal court decisions regarding adoption in Vir-
ginia, see Wooldridge v. Commonwealth, 453 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. Va. 1978) (foster parent
alleged violation of her rights under the due process, equal protection and freedom of relig-
ion clauses of the first and fourteenth amendments as a result of the removal of her foster
child by welfare department); Moore v. Richardson, 345 F. Supp. 75 (W.D. Va. 1972)
(unadopted child living with wage earner and wife was not entitled to collect children's
benefits under the Social Security Act because adoption petition was filed four years after
wage earner's death rather than two years as required by statute and because Virginia did
not recognize doctrine of equitable adoption).
353. - Va. , 265 S.E.2d 692 (1980).
354. The term "legal custody" is defined in § 16.1-228(0) of the Virginia Juvenile and
Domestic Relations District Court Law as follows:
[A] legal status created by court order which vests in a custodian the right to have
physical custody of the child, to determine where and with whom he shall live, the
right and duty to protect, train and discipline him and to provide him with food,
shelter, education and ordinary medical care, all subject to any residual parental
rights and responsibilities.
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(0) (Cur. Supp. 1980).
355. The term "residual parental rights and responsibilities" is defined in § 16.1-228(5) of
the Virginia Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court Law as follows:
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283(C)(2), '5 the trial court entered orders terminating the residual pa-
rental rights of Mr. and Mrs. Weaver and awarded those rights, including
the right to consent to an adoption, to the Roanoke Department of
Human Services. The Weavers appealed on the ground that the evidence
was insufficient to support the termination of their residual parental
rights.$58
In reviewing its line of decisions on the termination of residual parental
rights, the court in Weaver noted that the termination of the legal rela-
tionship between parent and child is a grave proceeding whether it occurs
in the context of an adoption or as a separate proceeding. The court cited
the Shank holding that a court order terminating parental rights renders
the parent "a legal stranger to the child" and severs "all parental
rights. ' 59 But the court also indicated that the statutes terminating the
legal relationship between parent and child should be interpreted consist-
ently with the governmental objective of preserving, when possible, the
parent-child relationship.3"
Although the Department stressed the significance of prior court orders
[A]11 rights and responsibilities remaining with the parent after the transfer of legal
custody or guardianship of the person, including but not limited to the right of visita-
tion, consent to adoption, the right to determine religious affiliation and the responsi-
bility for support.
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(5) (Cum. Supp. 1980). See also Hopper & Slayton, The Revision
of Virginia's Juvenile Court Law, 13 U. RiCm. L. Rav. 847 (1979).
356. - Va. at -., 265 S.E.2d at 694-95.
357. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (Cur. Supp. 1980) allows for the termination of residual
parental rights on the grounds of neglect, abuse, abandonment, and voluntary relinquish-
ment. 1977 Va. Acts, ch. 559 at 863. The trial court in Weaver relied specifically on VA.
CODE Am. § 16.1-283(C)(2) (Cur. Supp. 1980) which authorizes the termination of parental
rights if the court finds that such termination is in the best interests of the child and that
the "parent or parents, without good cause, have been unwilling or unable within a reasona-
ble period to remedy substantially the conditions which led to the child's foster care place-
ment, notwithstanding the reasonable and appropriate efforts of social, medical, mental
health or other rehabilitative agencies to such end."
358. - Va. at ., 265 S.E.2d at 693. The parties were married in 1969 and separated in
1974 after the birth of two children. The children were placed in a foster home for a brief
time and several couples unsuccessfully attempted to adopt the children. Mr. Weaver peti-
tioned to be relieved of custody, due to his financial inability to provide support, and cus-
tody of both children was granted to the Human Resources Department for placement in
foster care in 1976. Although the Department developed a plan to transfer custody to either
parent, neither parent was able to meet its requirements. Both parents continued to visit
the children. In 1979, the trial court found that it was in the best interests of the children to
terminate the Weavers' residual parental rights because their homes were unstable and in-
adequate for placement of the children. Id. at -.. , 265 S.E.2d at 693-94.
359. Id. at , 265 S.E.2d at 695.
360. Id.
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divesting both parents of their custodial rights and responsibilities, 3 ' the
supreme court noted that the proceeding in Weaver concerned the termi-
nation of residual parental rights as well as custody of the children. The
court held that "[a] final order terminating custodial rights does not
sever residual parental rights."3 62 The court then allocated the burden of
proof in the respective proceedings and stated that "the court order di-
vesting [the Weavers] of custodial rights did not place upon [them] the
burden of demonstrating that their residual parental rights should not be
terminated."3863
After examining the record and the requirements of code section 16.1-
283(C)(2), the court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to jus-
tify the termination of either parent's residual rights. As to Mr. Weaver,
the orders terminating his residual parental rights were reversed because
the record contained no evidence of what measures, if any, were taken by
rehabilitative agencies to provide him with assistance in remedying his
financial difficulties. The court held that "[iln the absence of evidence
indicating that 'reasonable and appropriate efforts' were taken by social
agencies to remedy the conditions leading to foster care, residual parental
rights cannot be terminated under Code § 16.1-283(C)(2)." 3" The orders
terminating Mrs. Weaver's residual parental rights were likewise reversed
because there was no evidence to indicate whether she had been offered
any assistance in remedying her financial inability to provide for her chil-
dren. The court also stressed that since she had not entered into a volun-
tary entrustment plan as had her husband, it was unclear how she could
have remedied the children's foster care placement.3 65
C. Miscellaneous
1. Name Changes of Married Women
In re Strikwerda 36 presented the Virginia Supreme Court with the
novel question of whether the petitions of two married women to resume
their maiden names, pursuant to former code section 8-577.1,367 could be
361. See cases cited in note 333 supra.
362. - Va. at _, 265 S.E.2d at 695 (emphasis added).
363. Id. (emphasis added).
364. Id. at , 265 S.E.2d at 697.
365. Id.
366. 216 Va. 470, 220 S.E.2d 245 (1975). For an extensive comment on the subject of
married women's names, see Comment, Married Women and the Name Game, 11 U. RICH.
L. Rav. 121 (1976).
367. V&. CODE ANN. § 8-577.1 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (currently codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-217 (Cum. Supp. 1980)).
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denied absent a finding of an illegal purpose. The trial court denied the
petitions, in which the husbands had joined, having found that only code
section 20-107 afforded a married woman the right to resume her maiden
name.16 8 In Strikwerda the supreme court summarily rejected the trial
court's reasoning and held that there was no conflict or inconsistency be-
tween former code sections 8-577.1 and 20-107. The court also held that
code section 20-107 was not intended to be the exclusive authority for
such a name change and that no statute prohibited a married woman
from resuming her maiden name.38 9 Since the trial court found that
neither party had filed her petition for an illegal, fraudulent or immoral
purpose, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the petitions of
the applicants to resume their maiden names.370 The court accordingly
reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for entry
of orders granting the petitions for change of name.3 7 1
The principles enunciated in Strikwerda were dispositive in In re
Miller,37 2 where a married woman petitioned to resume her maiden name.
There were no children of the marriage and the husband and wife agreed
that any children would bear the father's name. A number of creditors
had extended credit to the couple as husband and wife under the hus-
band's surname but the wife indicated that she intended to notify their
creditors of the name change. The lower court distinguished Strikwerda
on various grounds and denied the petition.373 The supreme court re-
368. 216 Va. at 472, 220 S.E.2d at 246. The second sentence of § 20-107 which concerned
resuming a former name was repealed by 1979 Va. Acts, ch. 1. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-121.4
(Cum. Supp. 1980) currently providing that:
Upon decreeing a divorce from the bond of matrimony the court shall, upon motion
of a party who changed his or her name by reason of marriage, restore such party's
former name either as part of the final decree or, upon request of such party, by
separate order meeting the requirements of § 8.01-217.
369. 216 V. at 472, 220 S.E.2d at 246.
370. Id. at 473, 220 S.E.2d at 247.
371. Id. The court also noted that a married woman is under no legal compulsion to as-
sume her husband's surname. Id. at 472, 220 S.E.2d at 246-47. Strikwerda is in line with the
decisions of other jurisdictions. See Marshall v. State, 301 So. 2d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974); Petition of Hauptly, 262 Ind. 150, 312 N.E.2d 857 (1974); Secretary of Common-
wealth v. City Clerk, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717, 722 (1977); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski, 71
Mich. App. 213, 247 N.W.2d 458 (1975); In re Application of Lawrence, 133 N.J. Super. 408,
337 A.2d 49 (1975); Application of Halligan, 46 A.D.2d 170, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1974); Kruzel
v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975). See also Comment, Married Women and
the Name Game, supra note 366 at 143-45.
372. 218 Va. 939, 243 S.E.2d 464 (1978).
373. Id. at 941-42, 243 S.E.2d at 466-67. The trial court assigned the following reasons for
denying Miller's petition to resume her maiden name (Brewer): (1) Strikwerda was not con-
trolling because it did not involve joint debts of husband and wife. Even though Miller
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versed and remanded, holding that Strikwerda was controlling and that
notice to creditors was not an express requirement of former code section8-577.1.374
Additionally, the court noted that there was nothing in that section, or
in the common law, which required a showing of a compelling need to
justify a change of name. "Such a requirement would be inconsistent with
the common-law principle that names may be changed in the absence of a
fraudulent purpose.' 375 The supreme court noted that the discretion of
the trial court to deny the applicant's petition was not unbridled but
rather had to be based on evidence, not speculation, that a change of
name would infringe upon the rights of others. Since the decision to deny
the applicant's petition was not based on a finding that the name change
was for an illegal, fraudulent or immoral purpose, the trial court therefore
abused its discretion in denying Miller's petition to resume her maiden
name.37 6
2. Name Changes of Children of Divorced Parents
The Virginia Supreme Court applies a test different than Strikwerda in
announced her intention to notify her creditors of the name change, the creditors would not
have adequate protection if she failed to notify them and thereafter changed her residence.
(2) There was no compelling need for a name change. (3) The proposed name change contra-
vened society's substantial interest in the easy identification of married persons. (4) Miller's
future children would be substantially burdened in explaining why they did not have their
mother's name and why their mother and father had different names. (5) The applicant
could satisfy her desire for a separate professional career under the provisions of § 59.1-69,
relating to transaction of business under an assumed name.
374. Id. at 942-43, 243 S.E.2d at 467. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the trial
court's characterization of Strikwerda was not meaningful. The inevitable confusion and
possibility of damage to a creditor which might result from a married woman resuming her
maiden name, or when a divorced woman or widow remarries and takes her husband's sur-
name, or when a single woman marries and takes the surname of her husband, were not
sufficient to deny an application for a change of name not sought for a fraudulent purpose
since the damage to creditors must be based on facts, not speculation. Id. at 943, 243 S.E.2d
at 467 (citing Matter of Natale, 527 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)).
375. 218 Va. at 943, 243 S.E.2d at 467 (citing Application of Hallingan, 46 A.D.2d 170,
171, 361 N.Y.S.2d 458, 460 (1974)).
376. 218 Va. at 944, 243 S.E.2d at 468. The court also disposed of the other reasons cited
by the trial court for denying Miller's petition: (1) The reasoning that the proposed name
change contravened society's substantial interest in the easy recognition of persons was
premised on erroneous compelling need standard and was inconsistent with Strikwerda. (2)
It was purely speculation to reason that a name change of the mother would have an embar-
rassing effect on her children. (3) The applicant was entitled to statutory protection of for-
mer code § 8-577.1 (now VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-217 (Cum. Supp. 1980)) even though there
were statutory provisions which might offer a simila form of relief, i.e., VA. CODE ANN.
§ 59.1-69 (Cum. Supp. 1980). 218 Va. at 943, 243 S.E.2d at 468.
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name changes of children where a divorced father objects. In Flowers v.
Cain,377 a mother who had custody of her minor children from a previous
marriage sought to change the children's name to the surname of her
present husband in order to avoid confusion and embarrassment to the
children. The trial court granted the mother's request over the father's
objection. Applying the best interest of the child test used by other
courts, the supreme court reversed the order and dismissed the name
change order.37 8 Strikwerda was not controlling due to its dissimilar fac-
tual and legal basis. However, the court noted that Strikwerda and other
cases recognized a father's interest in having his child continue to use his
name and the relevance of his interest to a determination of the child's
best interest.370
The court also held that the burden was upon the mother, rather than
the father, to prove by satisfactory evidence that a change in the chil-
dren's names would be in their best interest. But, regardless of where the
burden was placed, the court found that the trial court erred in ordering
the change of names.38° The mother was the only witness to testify in
support of the name change application and she offered only slight evi-
dence showing nothing more than "minor inconvenience or embarrass-
ment" to support her application. On the other hand, the court found the
evidence overwhelming that the objecting father had not abandoned the
natural ties with his children, that he had not engaged in misconduct
which would embarrass the children in the continued use of his name,
and that it would not be detrimental to the children to continue to bear
his name. Under these circumstances, the court held that a change of
names was not warranted.""
IV. CONCLUSION
The Virginia Supreme Court was very active in the area of domestic
377. 218 Va. 234, 237 S.E.2d 111 (1977).
378. Id. at 235-37, 237 S.E.2d at 113-14.
379. Id. at 236, 237 S.E.2d at 112-13.
380. 218 Va. at 237, 237 S.E.2d at 113. The Virginia Supreme Court noted that courts
elsewhere, in the aftermath of divorce, were reluctant to change a child's name over the
objection of a devoted father for fear that the change would further damage the already
strained father-child relationship. Thus, while applying the best interest test, other courts
declined to change a child's name over the natural father's objection unless substantial rea-
sons existed for the change. Id. at 236-37, 237 S.E.2d at 113. See, e.g., West v. Wright, 263
Md. 297, 302-03, 283 A.2d 401, 404 (1971); Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn. 34, 36, 223
N.W.2d 138, 140 (1974). See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 914 (1957).
381. 218 Va. at 237-39, 237 S.E.2d at 113-15. For a critical analysis of Flowers, see 1977-
1978 Virginia Survey, supra note 145, at 1444-45.
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relations and family law between 1970 and 1980, and it is somewhat diffi-
cult to summarize the major trend in these cases. As the foregoing discus-
sion indicates, however, many of the court's significant decisions during
the 1970's involved child custody or adoption issues where the court un-
dertook to examine closely the best interests of a child or children as well
as the various competing interests of those seeking custody or termina-
tion of parental rights. This author would therefore suggest the following
statement from Malpass v. Morgan as an appropriate nutshell of the
court's major development during the past decade: "Parental rights are to
be respected if at all consonant with the best interests of the child." This
summarization reflects the court's transformation of the "tender years"
doctrine from a maternal presumption to a tie breaking factor in child
custody as well as the court's protection of the rights of illegitimate chil-
dren despite their parents' moral vicissitudes. Decisions during the 1970's
on adoption and the termination of parental rights otherwise illustrate
the court's attempt to strike a balance, whenever possible, between the
best interests of the child and the rights of the natural parents as well as
the rights of the state and the adoptive parent.
Other noteworthy developments in the area of Virginia domestic rela-
tions between 1970 and 1980 include the increased utilization of the non-
fault separation statute, the recognition of the divisible divorce concept,
the awarding and apportionment of lump sum awards upon divorce, the
"de-sexing" of alimony, the enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Ju-
risdiction Act, and the application of the Revised Uniform Reciprocal En-
forcement Support Act. Also, the Virginia Supreme Court has remained
in step with the majority of decisions by disallowing alimony' after a
spouse's second voidable marriage and by allowing married women to re-
sume their maiden names without a showing of compelling cause.
On the other hand, Virginia continues to follow the minority of states
which do not permit the equitable distribution of marital property upon
divorce and which deny support and maintenance to a spouse at fault. In
light of the progressive advancements discussed above, it therefore re-
mains to be seen if the Virginia Supreme Court and the Virginia General
Assembly will continue to follow these minority positions during the next
decade, or if the court, in conjunction with the legislature, will adopt the
majority position.
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